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The attention that had been given to normativity of morality in both international 
political practice and academia is less in proportion to its importance. Before we rush 
to find out ways to bring about justice, it is necessary to first make clear the truth of 
justice – how should justice be; why should it be like such; and according to what 
should justice be as such. That is what normativity of morality can be hoped to bring 
for issues of international relations.  
    North Korean Nuclear Security Complex, along with the problems it brings about 
and is interwoven with, has baffled international relations scholars for decades. The 
relations and power balance between North Korea and South Korean, and with global 
and regional powers like the US, China, Japan, Russia; the power game and 
cooperation among these powers over North Korean nuclear issue; the collective 
security of Northeast Asian region; moral legitimacy of North Korea’s acquisition and 
possession of nuclear weapons; the justification of withdrawal from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the legitimacy of the Treaty itself, all these problems along 
with others intertwined with each other, causing and resulting in one another. To 
comb through this dreadlock of issues, a context-independent, fundamental, and 
normative philosophical theory is needed as guidance. In this dissertation, Kantian 
political philosophy as a nonideal theory of moral normativity is to be employed for 
such a role.  
    Immanuel Kant’s moral laws and political philosophy has made an astonishing 
come back in the realm of international relations and international rights in recent 
years. The philosophical claims he made in 18th century Europe have been 
reinterpreted in the context of 21st century international politics, therefore have 
provided guidance and theoretical support for several modern IR theories aiming to 
tackle problems that only exist in our contemporary world. Furthermore, when 
rereading Kant’s literature, scholars distinguished two theories in Kant’s moral 
theoretical system – ideal theory and nonideal theory. They conceptualized the 
relations of these two theories in different ways, as two different levels of Kantian 
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theory1, or as two forms of Kantian normativity2, or as two theories that govern two 
worlds 3 , yet one thing is certain – they all suggested such distinction when 
interpreting Kant’s work.  
In this dissertation, the moral legitimacy of some key practices within North 
Korean Nuclear Security Complex will be analyzed in the perspective of Kantian 
nonideal theory. First, I attempt to point out the distinctive features and different 
understandings of Kantian nonideal theory; incorporate them and uncover the 
principal clue of the relation between Kantian nonideal theory and Kant’s ideal 
philosophy; then giving out a reasonable description of what is meant by Kantian 
nonideal theory. This would be the main content of chapter two.  
With the following sections, I first apply the interpretation of Kantian nonideal 
theory on the context of North Korean nuclear issue, by arguing North Korea has the 
moral legitimacy to acquire nuclear weapons in an unjust, nonideal circumstance, 
with strict restrictions regarding its handling and intentions with them – in chapter 
three, I intend to take up Doyle’s analysis as a reference – Doyle suggested that in the 
perspective of Kantian nonideal theory, Iran is morally permitted to utilize nuclear 
deterrence for the necessity of national defence and therefore permitted to acquire 
nuclear weapons for the credibility of such deterrence, even though the NPT forbids it. 
I shall first examine Doyle’s argument and conclusion in my own terms; point out the 
problems existing in the process of his inquiry along the way; modify his assumptions; 
conclude the examination by bringing forth a modified assessment with adjusted 
conditions and terminology. Together with the revised assessment there is normative 
analysis on the process of acquiring and stockpiling nuclear weapons, and the detailed 
assessment on nuclear deterrence on militaries and civilians, as a complement of the 
assessment.  
In chapter four, the historical context of North Korean Nuclear Security Complex is 
introduced; and relevant context and facts are invoked as evidence to assess the 
morality of policies related to the Complex and the practices taken up by the parties 
within it. I will illustrate the historical interactions among parties within the Complex 
and how North Korea’s decision of acquiring nuclear military capability should be 
 
1 De Federicis, 2013., p. 1. Also see Korsgaard, 1996., p. 153 
2 Horn, 2016., p. 91.  
3 Doyle, 2010., p. 100.  
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deemed as morally permissible.  
For chapter five I will introduce another right in Kantian morality system – the 
right of non-intervention. I first conceptualize the term of intervention; then 
enumerate the cases of exception where interference would not be deemed as 
violation of duty of non-intervention, and explicate their groundings as exceptions. 
Then I will explain how North Korea does not belong to either cases of exception 
therefore shall boast its full right of non-intervention. Hence incorporated with the 
context of the Complex, we can come to the conclusion that all punitive actions done 
based on North Korea’s decision of acquiring nuclear military capability should be 
morally scrutinized for the violation of North Korea’s right of non-intervention. 
Violation of morality on the DPRK’s side does not excuse another violation of 
morality from any other international relations actor. And the actions of punishment 
cannot be used as a means by other states to seek their own ends.  
The obligation for states to join a union of states is discussed in chapter six. I first 
introduce North Korea’s state governing strategy and guiding ideology Juche; then 
explain how self-reliance – as the essence of Juche ideology – has long been North 
Korea’s state governing mentality and constitutionalized guidance. Although joining a 
union of state is considered an obligation and immediate duty for a state, the decision 
for a state to join must be a voluntary and autonomous one. Then I discuss the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the potential institutional subversion it has suffered from. I 
acknowledge North Korea’s right and morality in deciding to withdraw from the 
Treaty, and question the viability for North Korea to rejoin the NPT, should it desire 
to show its commitment to global nuclear disarmament. At the end I talk about US-
DPRK relations normalization, how this might be the only union of states North 
Korea is interested in joining currently and how such normalization is crucial for 
solving the North Korea nuclear crisis.  
Chapter seven concludes.  
 
2. What is Kantian Nonideal Theory and its Role in International 
Politics 
In his work The value of philosophy in nonideal circumstances, Adam Swift gave 
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compelling clarification on the role of philosophy in unjust, nonideal circumstances. 
He suggested that the goal for doing political philosophy would be to know or 
understand the truth about justice rather than to motivate action towards it, thus the 
aim is epistemological, not practical. 4  The role he believed to be assigned to 
philosophy is twofold – to analyze various values at stake, and to judge the relative 
value of said values. 5 Not only do we need political philosophy as guidance – along 
with social sciences as measures – for developing policy options for our current 
circumstances, we also look towards pure philosophy that is independent to context as 
action guidance for choosing from those options and the reasons backing such choice.  
Christine Korsgaard sketched a systematic depiction of the relations between 
Kant’s theory as an ideal and Kantian nonideal theory by drawing from John Rawls’s 
strategy in a division of moral philosophy. In her work The right to lie: Kant on 
dealing with evil, she suggested that Kant’s moral law sets “a high ideal of conduct 
and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing”6, the 
result of which could turn out catastrophic. Therefore special principles are needed for 
dealing with evil or complexity in evil circumstances; and a certain structure must be 
in place in order for an ethical system to accommodate such special principles; and 
she proposed such structure for Kant’s theory as a double-level theory in which 
Kant’s moral law as the ideal and the special principles for evil circumstances as 
Kantian nonideal theory. 7 
Korsgaard proposed that Kantian moral theoretical system could be seen as 
governing two worlds – one is an ideal world that is a perfectly just society, in which 
everyone act justly and their actions and ends are completely determined by reason; 
and its historical, economic, and natural conditions are such that realization of the 
ideal is feasible; and there are no massive historic injustices needed to be corrected. 
The other world is a nonideal world in which there is non-compliance, punishment, 
war, opposition to unjust regimes, and compensatory justice; and there will be certain 
natural conditions or other circumstances in this world making the full realization of a 
just state of affairs impossible. In the first world, Kant’s ideal theory is applied; for 
the second world, Kantian nonideal theory is applied – the nonideal theory is not 
 
4 Swift, 2008., p. 366.  
5 Ibid, p. 369.  
6 Korsgaard, 1996., p. 133.  
7 Ibid, p. 135; p. 147.  
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applied without regard to circumstances – it is applied in the nonideal circumstances.8 
The relations between these two theories could be seen as such: on the one hand, in 
figuring out how to achieve the ideals such as justice, equality, and peace in ideal 
circumstances, people can determine, in light of such ideal theory, what is to be done 
in actual circumstances.9 In nonideal circumstances, when ideals cannot be realized 
effectively, then they, and the ways to realize them in the ideal circumstances, become 
a goal, rather than something to live up to; and people should work toward the 
conditions that make realizing them feasible. On the other hand, the nonideal theory 
can tell us which of our nonideal options is least bad, and closest to ideal conduct. If 
some temporary inequality or injustice does in fact facilitate the realization or at least 
the approaching the realization of the goal, they will be allowed, in the condition that 
they do not violate the “general conception”10 – that is the formula of universal law in 
Kantian moral system11. In sufficiently bad circumstances, even acting according to 
nonideal theory cannot get us anywhere near ideals, the absolute minimum 
requirement would be not to violate the formula of universal law. 12 In Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the formula of universal law as the only 
categorical imperative: 
There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law. 13 
 Categorical imperatives can be best seen as the basis of all the moral duties in 
Kant’s ethical system; therefore the formula of universal law is the groundwork 
principle that underlies the other moral laws in Kantian moral system, such as the 
formula of humanity and the kingdom of ends, which are derived from the formula of 
universal law. 14 
    Christoph Horn attempted to explain why Kant’s political normativity appears so 
different from his moral one. He suggested a new way of interpreting Kant’s work, in 
which he pointed out that according to Kant, the type of normativity being applied in 
 
8 Ibid, pp. 147 – 148.  
9 Ibid, p. 148.  
10 Ibid., p. 148.  
11 Ibid., p. 151.  
12 Ibid., p. 153.  
13 Kant, 1998 (1785)., p. 31 (AA, 4:421).  
14 Ibid., p. 37 (AA, 4: 429), p. 41 – 42 (AA, 4: 433 - 434).  
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the political realm is in fact different yet still somehow connected with his moral 
law.15 He emphasized that Kant has repeatedly identified in his multiple works that 
reason is the basis and the source for his moral normativity as well as his political 
philosophy.16 Horn proposed that Kant indicated the practical reason generates two 
forms of normativity, the one ideal, the other nonideal 17 ; and Kant’s political 
philosophy – the theory of his political and legal normativity – can be taken as an 
attenuation of his moral normativity, in the sense of a non-ideal theory.18 Kantian 
non-ideal theory can be seen as an attempt to “weaken full-blown normativity in the 
face of sub-optimal circumstances”, make it usable in practice without surrendering 
too many fundamental claims.19 And such non-ideal normativity does not only serve 
as an application of Kant’s moral conception in unjust, nonideal circumstances, but 
more importantly a moral guidance in political realm that can be followed durably:  
Kant has formulated a non-ideal form of normativity, according to which ‘non-
ideal’ means : a weaker version of normativity which can be lived up to by 
human beings, which is appropriate to specific situations and which is intended 
for long-term effect, namely that of a historical development.20  
Horn indicated that nonideal theory allows in-between stages from the complete 
surrender of moral demands to the requirement of their full implementation.21 The 
nonideal normativity is a long-term approximation of the ideal one 22 ; and the 
principles of morality and of political reality are antagonistic only when “one tries to 
obey the norm ‘with impetuosity’” 23 . Hence, the normativity matching historical 
expectation can only be of “a non-ideal, reduced, practicable form suitable for specific 
situations”24.  
From above we could try to summarize the distinctive features of Kantian nonideal 
theory and propose a definition for it. First of all, Kantian nonideal theory is generated 
from practical reason, which is also the sole base of Kant’s moral theory. Kantian 
nonideal theory is different from his ideal morality, the difference is apparent; yet as 
 
15 Ibid., p. 89.  
16 Horn, 2016., p. 92.  
17 Ibid., p. 92.  
18 Ibid., p.91.  
19 Ibid., p.100. 
20 Ibid., p.91. 
21 Ibid., p. 101. 
22 Ibid., p. 102.  
23 Ibid., p. 105.  
24 Ibid., p. 105 
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they are generated from the same source, they are connected inevitably. Second, 
Kantian nonideal theory is applied in nonideal circumstances, which is our current 
world. To employ nonideal theory instead of ideal theory in nonideal circumstances, 
according to Kant, can bring us closer to the ultimate pursuits of humanity. Third, 
Kantian nonideal theory has weaker moral requirements toward its follower than the 
ideal theory. It allows middle ground between the full-scale conformity of moral 
requirements and the total abandonment of them; therefore it is practically applicable 
for long-term human development.  
Both Kant’s moral normativity and Kantian nonideal theory are for the purpose of 
seeking the truth of the holy grail of human development – justice, perpetual peace, 
egality, freedom, and so forth. Kant’s understandings of what to do in ideal 
circumstances to achieve and maintain the supreme goals of humanity consist his 
moral normativity; also shed light on what Kant thinks humans should be in nonideal 
circumstances, which give rise to Kantian nonideal theory. These two together 
constitute Kantian ethical theoretical system. Thus we could define Kantian nonideal 
theory as follows: it is a part of Kant’s ethical system; it is modified from Kant’s ideal 
moral theory in a way that it works as a guidance in nonideal circumstances to 
maximally approach the ideals for historical human development.  
    Both ideal and nonideal theory of Kant have tremendous value for international 
political practice and theoretical development. We could develop from Swift’s 
assignment on philosophy and Korsgaard’ s idea of ideal being the goal to seek, and 
suggest that while Kant’s ideal theory works as a lighthouse in current world, Kantian 
nonideal theory works as a road map – to come up with options and to rank the 
options for a specific social or political situation – including a situation like the North 
Korean Nuclear Security Complex. As Swift explicated, when we are confronted by 
the real world, as social science tells us the feasible set of short-to-medium term 
policies for making the world more just we will still need philosophy to evaluate, rank, 
and opt from the set; and to orient ourselves in developing long-term policies. 25 We 
could see from the above the potential of Kantian nonideal theory serving as the 
philosophical orientation for long-term development of human society.  
    We can see that Kantian nonideal theory is such a moral normativity that can 
 
25 Swift, 2008., p. 375.  
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facilitate human beings with the making of short and medium term policies in 
political realm as well as other real-life circumstances which are almost always far 
from perfect. It can be used to direct us towards a world that is generally more just in 
a way that it gives out a collection of viable alternatives according to the specificity of 
the situation and prioritizes them, along with logical reasons for generating and 
sorting this collection. It preserves what Kant deemed the most crucial for mankind in 
morality – justice and the honoring of rights – while reality is too difficult for other 
virtues to be redeemed.  
In the following I will try to cull from the works of Kant and works of scholars 
interpreting his works the pertinent arguments of Kantian nonideal theory, with which 
could be used to analyze the moral situations of North Korean Nuclear Security 
Complex, and the policies and practices employed by the related parties of it.  
 
3. The Right of Self-Defence 
 
3.1.  Some References 
 
T.E. Doyle examined the ethical problem regarding the potential Iranian 
Proliferation Complex drawing from Kantian nonideal theory. He started by 
criticizing the focus on contemporary non-proliferation policy should be on incentives 
and expectations instead of the current practice that is strategy and technology leaning, 
which ought to be approached from a political/moral angle. He moved on by 
suggesting that nuclear ethical analysis should not rely only on the ideal moral 
theories, for the reason that their application and misapplication reinforce the 
perception that morality is irrelevant to politics and political inquiry. Rather, the 
research regarding nuclear ethics should carefully consider the nonideal moral 
principles “whose aim is to alleviate national, regional or global insecurity, and/or 
realize a greater measure of international justice while not insisting that each and 
every injustice is addressed all at once.”26 Then he proposed Kantian nonideal theory 
as the stance best addressing the issue in question as he argued that Kant is the only 
 
26 Doyle, 2010., p. 90.  
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great thinker to put peace among states and peoples as a fundamental principle of 
philosophy; and Kant’s unusual rigorism in moral requirements could help certain 
inquiries regarding nuclear ethics achieve methodological parsimony.  
Doyle stated that Iran was trapped in a security dilemma – it is an NPT signatory, 
yet the hostility from Sunni states, Israel and the United States convinced it that 
nuclear weapons is the only effective deterrence against attacks on it. He explicated 
then how the wrongful intentions principle and the principle of the morality of social 
institutions – the two major principles employed by Kantian ideal ethicists, as well as 
their realist critiques, could all be unsuitable or even dangerous for contemporary 
nuclear policy making. Following, Doyle proposed Kant’s views on self-defence for 
individuals and for nations as the first source drawn from Kantian nonideal theory.  
He started by claiming self defence in Kantian sense is best understood as a 
reciprocal relation by invoking Kant’s formula of humanity as support. Kant’s 
formula of humanity dictates the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, 
never merely as a means.27  Then he demonstrated two cases both of which the 
condition constitutes as nonideal – when state authority is incapable of protecting 
individuals from criminal attacks, and when one’s life is under direct harm by another. 
He went on with Kant’s justification of lying as a means of self-defence and 
distinguished Kant’s implication that although it is categorically prohibited to violate 
the rights of humanity, it might be necessary sometimes to put them at risk. He 
furthered the argument indicating that a well-meaning lie told in self-defence has 
different implications for moral and legal responsibility than one used in the defence 
of another, for successful lying in self-defence deters and prevents wrongdoing 
committed on oneself without violation of the aggressor’s rights. And this type of lie 
sheds light on the domestic analogies for the nuclear self-defence of states. Doyle 
concluded his argument on self-defence by incorporating the above and formulating a 
corollary maxim: “use only those modes of self-defense that remain within the bounds 
of reciprocity as conditioned by a wrongdoer’s offense.”28 
Doyle commenced his examination on Kant’s national defence under anarchy 
conditions by suggesting Kant regards the duties of public right as a condition 
 
27 Kant, 1998 (1785)., p. 38 (AA, 4: 429).  
28 Doyle, 2010., p. 99.  
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necessary to the construction of long-term security and peace. Following, he 
suggested that Kant contends in an international state of nature, every state has the 
right to go to war, which is identical to self-defence right. Doyle identified his point 
of inquiry between Kant’s permission of standing armies as a temporary instrument to 
deter or respond proportionally to aggression, and Kant’s proscription of hostile act 
that would destroy mutual trust beyond redemption.  
Doyle invoked Kant’s formula of universal law as his second source of nonideal 
theory. He attempted to examine national defence by means of deception with this 
formula by first elaborated on the reasons for the Formula is to be obeyed by its 
addressees even against their inclination; then established that the Formula is the 
unyielding bottom line drawn beyond which any claim of violation of duty is 
unjustified. He continued by arguing that morality in nonideal conditions permits 
deception even though general morality proscribes it – it is permitted to keep 
autonomy rights from being trod underfoot by liars and assailants.  
On applying Kantian nonideal theory to contemporary nuclear proliferation, Doyle 
started by emphasizing that right to go to war should entail the right to threaten to go 
to war, which includes the right to acquire the armaments needed for warfare. Then he 
indicated that to morally assess the nuclear aspirant’s pursuit on nuclear weapons, 
first we need to morally assess its deterrent intentions against its rival. Doyle did it by 
dividing its intentions into “carry out” and “never carry out”, and its threatening 
targets into “military centers” and “population/government centers”, enumerated all 
the possible combinations of these divisions, and examined the combinations with the 
formula of universal law. After rejecting the maxim of overkill and the maxim of 
strict nuclear reciprocity, Doyle suggested that carrying out the deterrent threats 
strictly against military centers is permissible by Kantian nonideal theory, given that 
carrying out the threats would not lead to a counterforce escalation that entailed 
massive collateral damage. He also went into detailed examination with another 
combination – carrying out strikes on military centers while threaten but never intend 
to strike population/government centers. By invoking Kant’s sixth Preliminary Article 
that proscribes acts of hostility which would make mutual trust impossible in future 
peace, Doyle rejected this combination arguing that the promise of harm conveyed by 
the lie will cultivate enmity and made trust building impossible.  
11 
 
Doyle concluded his work by giving out the Kantian nonideal moral assessment 
regarding Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. He contended that as a 
persuasive nuclear deterrent lie is necessary for national defence, Iran, among other 
nuclear aspirants would be morally permissible to acquire nuclear weapons even 
though the NPT forbids it, in order to establish the credibility of the threats.  
 
3.2. Domestic Analogies, the Right to Lie, and the State of Nature 
    Kant in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals introduced The formula of 
universal law as a law that determines the absolute good will without limitation, 
without regard to any effect that might come with.29 Kantian scholars acknowledged 
that the formula of universal law as the one moral guideline that tells us what we must 
not in any case, even the worst circumstances, do30; that it “draws a line beyond 
which no claim of exclusion or suspension from duty is justified”31; and it “provides 
the point at which morality is uncompromising”.32 That means, even when facing 
non-compliance with moral, civil, and international legal requirements – that is, in the 
contexts of evil – one must act in accordance with the formula of universal law.  
When explicating the formula of universal law and enumerating examples for 
division of perfect and imperfect duties, Kant expounded that self-love is to be a 
universal law by counterarguing the opposite: “It is then seen at once that a nature 
whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose 
destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself and would 
therefore not subsist as nature”. 33  Therefore, preserving one’s physical wellbeing 
should be seen as in accordance with the formula of universal law; and it falls in the 
category of perfect duty to oneself as it is “the right of humanity in our own person”34. 
Further, Kant listed preserving oneself in nature as the first (though not the principle) 
perfect duty of a human being within the doctrine of virtue in the Metaphysics of 
Morals (MM).35 It is clear that Kant regards preserving oneself as the fundamental 
moral duty of human being; it is when preserving oneself comes with a price of 
 
29 Kant, 1998 (1785)., p. 14(AA, 4:402), p. 31 (AA, 4:421). 
30 Korsgaard, 1996., p.154. 
31 Doyle, 2010., p. 103.  
32Korsgaard, 1996., p. 154 
33 Kant, 1998 (1785)., p. 32 (AA, 4:422). 
34 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 32 (AA, 6:240) 
35 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 176 (AA, 6:421). 
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harming others, does the situation become tricky.  
Kant included the right of necessity into the doctrine of right, as ambiguous right. 
In explicating the right of necessity, Kant recognized the right to ethically blameless 
self-defence on the attempt to deprive the culprit’s life when he is issuing a “wrongful 
assailant upon [one’s] life”. On the contrary, Kant indicated that taking the life from 
an innocent man, that is from whom did nothing to harm one’s life, in order to 
preserve one’s life is only unpunishable, but not inculpable – that is, a right of 
necessity but ethically blamable.36 In Theory and Practice Kant went on elucidating 
that necessity can only exist in a case where there is a conditional duty in conflict with 
an unconditional duty. To preserve one’s life is only conditional duty, while not to 
take an innocent life (innocent in the sense as he has committed no offense against 
one’s life) is an unconditional duty. Yet, the deed of saving one’s life by violence is 
not punishable by death because it would be absurd to threaten one’s life if he did not 
voluntarily give up his life.37  
    From this we could deduce that it is blameless and in accordance with the universal 
law that one exercises lethal self-defence on the culprit when one’s life is under direct 
attack by said culprit; but the violence of one’s self-defence is only permissible to 
apply on the culprit, as doing harm to an innocent man to save one’s own life is not 
permissible in Kant’s both ideal theory and non-ideal theory. As the duty of self-
defence of individual person could be the basis “from which we draw tentative 
‘domestic analogies’ for national defense” according to Doyle38, and “sovereign is a 
morally sensitive person” according to Horn39, plus that Kant recognized most states 
as ‘moral persons’40, we could deduce that the violence of one state’s self-defence is 
permissible when under attack, only against some parts of the perpetrating state(s), 
which are directly inflicting the attack, but never to non-participating state(s). For 
how to determine the proper degree of self-defence, Doyle’s interpretation of self-
defence as “reciprocal or mutual relation”41 renders the decision – “use only those 
modes of self-defence that remain within the bounds of reciprocity as conditioned by 
 
36 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 27 – 28. (AA, 6:235 – 6:236) 
37 Kant, 1991., p. 81 notes (AA, 8:300n).  
38 Doyle, 2010. p. 97 
39 Horn, 2016., p. 108.  
40 Cavallar, 2001. p. 240. Also see Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 114 (AA, 6:343).  
41 Doyle, 2010. p. 98.  
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a wrongdoer’s offense.”42 
Of equal importance is the right to go to war and the right of prevention introduced 
in the doctrine of right as a right of nations in MM. Kant recognized the right for a 
state to go to war in the state of nature.43 The conditions to permit the prosecution of 
the right include that the state believes it has been wronged by the other state; or the 
state is threatened by active violations of first aggression from the other state. The 
threats of active violations include the other state being the first to undertake 
preparations, or the menacing increase in the other state’s power. 44  Merely the 
condition of the superior power is a wrong to the lesser power even before the former 
commits any deed; and this alone can be the legitimate ground for an attack from the 
lesser power.45 In the same paragraph, Kant recognized the right of prevention, which 
is best understood as the right to undertake preparations for war if state is threatened 
by the possibility of going to war. Yet if a state takes preparations without being 
threatened by war, this action itself becomes aggressive therefore should be seen as a 
menacing increase of power by other states.  
Although Kant arrived at a negative conclusion in Toward Perpetual Peace, 
regarding whether political prudence confers a right to the lesser power to attack the 
superior power, his reasoning for negating the right is solely based on announcing 
preemptive attack publicly “would bring about more surely and more quickly the very 
evil it feared”.46 Regardless of the ambiguity of the right to declare war to the superior 
power, we could perceive Kant’s explicit stand on which he recognized the lesser 
power’s right to undertake preparations when it genuinely believes it is threatened by 
another state.47 Therefore, although secretive preemptive attack on the superior power 
is unjust for it is starting a war without first renouncing peace48, and it is against 
Kant’s principle of publicity; undertaking unannounced preparations for war on the 
lesser power’s side is considered legitimate in Kantian term.  
 
3.2.1. Domestic Analogies 
 
42 Ibid., p. 99. 
43 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 116 (AA, 6:346).  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Kant, 1991., p. 128 (AA,8:384).  
47 “the right of prevention”: Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 116 (AA, 6:346). 
48 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 116 (AA, 6:346). 
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Yet before moving on, there are three problems needed to be addressed – first one 
is taking domestic analogies from self-defence right of individuals for national 
defence. Doyle argued by such analogies, the reciprocal-relation feature of individual 
self-defence can also be found from the self-defence right of states, that is the national 
defence right. Then by proving Kant permits lying for self-defence for individuals, he 
argued that Kant permits states to lie via nuclear deterrence for national defence. 
However, Doyle seemed to have taken such analogies as implied, further proceeded 
his analysis without first proving the feasibility of such analogies. So, is making such 
analogies reasonable? I would say affirmative according to the following two points:  
First, self-defence right for individuals is proved to be supported by Kantian 
nonideal moral principles. A state, according to Kant, is “the whole of individuals in a 
rightful condition, in relation to its own members”49, therefore a state can be seen as a 
collection of individuals under a constitution, and these individuals, “that is , the 
members of a state, are called citizens of a state”50 . Kant emphasized as human 
beings are always as an end and not merely as a means to the state, they must always 
be regarded and treated as co-legislating members of the state. Hence, they must be 
given the right to decide, as a collective entity, on whether the state should go to war. 
This right is derived from the duty of the sovereign to the people, and in this way, the 
people represents the sovereign itself. 51 Kant goes on indicating that a state has the 
right to go to war when it is threatened to be violated or is violated; it also has the 
right of prevention to take preparation in case it has to go to war;52 and it is permitted 
for states to provisionally have army, weapons, and monetary support to defend itself 
from external attacks. 53 Incorporating the above all, we can know that the people has 
the right to collectively decide to protect themselves from external attacks utilizing 
necessary instruments. Therefore, lying as a national defence means should be 
morally permitted for the reason that armies and weapons are capable of violation of 
rights of humanity (although they are necessary evil for prosecution of national right 
of defence); while lying is merely putting them at risk. 
Second, as Kant generalizes all states as “states” when he describes public rights, 
 
49 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 89 (AA, 6:311).  
50 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 91 (AA, 6:314).  
51 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 115 - 116 (AA, 6:345 – 346).  
52 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 116 (AA, 6:346).  
53 Kant, 1991., p. 95 (AA, 8:345).  
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and we could assume that states, as moral persons, are at least equal in their rights of 
states, which include right to go to war, right in war, and right after war. As Kant says 
in the right of nations we need to consider not only the relation of one state toward 
another, but also the relation of individual persons of one state toward the individuals 
of another, and toward another state as a whole; and this is the only difference 
between the state of nature of individuals and that of nations. 54 Therefore, right of 
nations should be considered another layer of rights added on to the lay of rights of 
individuals. And as it is every human’s perfect duty to treat oneself and all others 
always as an end and never merely as a means to an end, the extent of national 
defence should be limited in an area from minimum effective to the bound of 
reciprocity as conditioned by the wrongdoer’s offense.  Therefore, although the full 
analogies of individual self-defence to national defence is debatable, the part that 
works as the basis of Doyle’s argument is proved to be solid.  
3.2.2. The Right to Lie 
Lying was established to be permissible as a national defence measure in Doyle’s 
conclusion, yet Kant proscribes lying in his ideal theoretical system, making it an 
immoral conduct to begin with. I attempt here to support Doyle’s conclusion of 
permission to lie for national defence in the form of nuclear deterrence with further 
discussion on the right to lie in evil, nonideal circumstances. In her work Creating the 
Kingdom of Ends, Korsgaard elaborated in one chapter how lying to a deceiver to 
prevent one being used as a means to evil is allowed even required in a nonideal 
circumstance. Korsgaard contended that among the three formulas of Kantian 
categorical imperative, the formula of humanity and the kingdom of ends are stricter 
than the formula of universal law55. As she proposed to interpret the Kantian ethical 
system as a double-level theory, in evil circumstances, the formula of humanity and 
kingdom of ends provide an ideal to live up to, while the formula of universal law 
draws the line beyond which is uncompromisable. She concluded that deception is 
impermissible under either the formula of humanity or the kingdom of ends; however 
under the formula of universal law, it is permissible to lie to deceivers in order to 
counteract the intended results of their deceptions. One has the right to resist liars due 
to their methods – to use one’s reason as a means, to use one’s honesty as a tool. 
 
54 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 114 (AA, 6:343 – 344).  
55 Korsgaard, 1996., p. 143 – 144.  
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Korsgaard quoted Kant in his Lectures on Ethics the following:  
If we were to be at all times punctiliously truthful we might often become 
victims of the wickedness of others who were ready to abuse our 
truthfulness. …if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my 
lie is a weapon of defense. 56 
Korsgaard therefore concluded that lying to a liar is a form of self-defence, as one 
owes it to humanity in one’s own person not to allow one’s honesty to be used as a 
resource for evil.57 
 
3.2.3. The State of Nature 
The third problem is regarding the precondition of the right to go to war. Kant 
identified that the prosecution of such right is allowed in the state of nature among 
states. So what is a state of nature among states? According to Kant in MM, states are 
by nature in a non-rightful condition58; like individuals in nature before they unit 
under a will – the constitution – and form a state59. This non-rightful condition is a 
condition of war – it is not necessarily a condition of actual war and outbreak of 
hostilities, but a constant threat of hostilities60, therefore it is a condition of injustice, a 
condition that no dispute can be settled by a lawsuit, instead only by war. 61This 
condition is in itself wrong in the highest degree, and states are under obligation to 
leave it62, to join a union of states and thus establish a state of peace.  
Doyle identified current international relations as in Lockean anarchy – a concept 
taken from Wendt; yet problem is: does Kantian sense of “state of nature” equals 
Wendt’s “Lockean anarchy”? More importantly, is the current international relations, 
or at least the context of North Korean Nuclear Security Complex in Kant’s state of 
nature? Further on, in Kantian nonideal perspective, is a state morally permitted to 
take the preparation to defend itself in current international relation? And is North 
Korea morally permitted to do so with nuclear weapons? 
 
56 Ibid., p. 144.  
57 Ibid., p. 144, p. 146.  
58 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 114 (AA, 6:344).  
59 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 89 (AA, 6:311).  
60 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 72 (AA, 8:349).  
61 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 116, p. 120 (AA, 6:346, 6:351).  
62 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 114 (AA, 6:344).  
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The inquiry of these answers is best to start with identifying the alternative(s) to 
Kant’s state of nature amongst states. For states to leave the state of nature, they are 
obligated to join “a league of nations”63  to protect themselves from attacks from 
without. This league is a “pacific federation” – in the sense that it seeks to end all 
wars forever. 64 It does not involve sovereign authority, but only “an association”. 65 It 
must be “an alliance” of states that can be renounced at any time and therefore must 
be renewed from time to time. 66 Perpetual peace can only be achieved when all states 
are encompassed in this union, and that is when all the rights becomes conclusive and 
a true condition of peace is established. 67 Before that, any rights of nations are merely 
provisional. With states joined in this union, disputes among members can be settled 
in a civil way – by a lawsuit – instead of in a barbaric way, namely by war. 68 
Kant has described this union in The Metaphysics of Morals with different words 
like “league”, “alliance”, and “association”. In Perpetual Peace, he indicates this 
union as a “pacific federation”, a “federative union” and the state which would lead 
all nations to perpetual peace as “the idea of federalism” .69 Yet in the same page he 
also refers the member states of this union as “confederated states”.  Therefore it begs 
a further analysis on what type of political form this “union” is and which words can 
be used to correctly name it. John Law had an elaborated discussion regarding 
federalism and constructed a definition for it in his work How can we define 
federalism.  He suggested that there are two distinct federal models within federalism, 
instead of only one which we have commonly known – the federal state or the 
federation.70 The second model is what he called the federal union of states, which is 
“a multi-state political system in which there is a division of powers between two 
levels of government of equal status.”71 The key difference between a federal union 
of states and a federal state is the former is a multi-state federalism by treaty or 
compact, and the latter a federalism by constitution. 72  And what separates a 
confederation of states and a federal union of states is that the general government is 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (AA, 8:356).  
65 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 115 (AA, 6:345). 
66 Ibid.  
67 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 119 (AA, 6:350); Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (8:356).  
68 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 120 (AA, 6:351).  
69 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (8:356). 
70 Law, 2013., p. E – 104, E – 109.  
71 Ibid., p. E – 105.  
72 Ibid., p. E – 109.  
18 
 
subordinate to the regional government for the former, and is of equal status for the 
latter. 73 
Let’s return to Kant’s description of this ‘union’ – we could know it is not a 
universal state or a world republic, as Kant stipulates in Perpetual Peace the Second 
Definitive Article that “this would constitute a federation of peoples, which would not, 
however, necessarily be a state of peoples”, and different states “are not to be fused 
together into one state”. 74 On this point, Kleingeld offered a proposal that Kant is not 
saying one should reject the idea of the state of states, he merely “presents us with a 
view as to how to start leaving the international state of nature”75, which corroborated 
that this union of states is not a state of states. Further and more distinctive evidence 
is from The Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant explicates that this union 
“must…involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution), but only an 
association, it must be an alliance that can be renounced at any time and so must be 
renewed from time to time”. 76 And he identifies an association of several states to 
preserve peace as a congress, in which more states will join and finally becomes a 
universal union. Kant indicates the congress as “a voluntary coalition of different 
states which can be dissolved at any time, not a federation (like that of the American 
states) which is based on a constitution and can therefore not be dissolved”. From the 
above we could see the union is not a state of states; and it is not a federal state by 
constitution.  
John Law further specified the critical sub-concept of equal status between general 
government and regional government through reference to three attributes: (i) 
constitutional protection of the regional government, (ii) the direct effect of law of the 
general government, and (iii) majority-voting in the decision making process of the 
general government. 77 First attribute refers to the absence of a right for the general 
government unilaterally either to abolish or to reduce the powers of the regional 
governments. From above we know that neither is this union a state nor does it have a 
federal constitution, and it does not aim at the “acquisition of some sort of power”78; 
therefore the member states of this union should have constitutional independence. 
 
73 Ibid., p. E – 105.  
74 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 78 (AA, 8:354). 
75 Kleingeld, 2004., p. 307.  
76 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 115 (AA, 6:345). 
77 Law, 2013., p. E – 106.  
78 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (AA, 8:356).  
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For the second and third attributes, Kant indicates the international right a state 
entitles to is according to universally valid external law 79  and guaranteed by a 
“surrogate for the compact of civil society”, which is a “superior legislative authority”. 
80 And since this union aims for securing and maintaining the freedom, permanent 
peace, and deciding disputes among states by lawsuits, the direct effect of law of the 
general government must be applicable in this union; and the blocking or ‘veto’ 
power of individual regional government must be ended within the common sphere of 
action at least regarding peace and justice among states. From the above we can know 
that Kant’s league of nations is best seen as a universal federal union of states.  
We could see that Kant has two visions expressed clearly for the relations among 
states – state of nature and a universal federal union of states. Compared with the 
current international system, where there are international laws, numerous global and 
regional organizations to address problems in various aspects on various levels, and 
global factors like trade, globalization, and climate change making nations and 
individuals interweave with each other further; it is hard to associate today’s 
international relations with state of nature. Yet the long list of wars, conflicts, 
insurgencies, clashes, and skirmishes happened in the past few decades or still 
ongoing, together with the unjust situations causing them that are not being settled by 
International Court of Justice or United Nations Security Council; it is clear that our 
world is still a long way from Kant’s universal union of states. Subsequently we ask: 
Has Kant indicated a stage in between? How is the current world compared with that 
stage? And what rights do states have in that stage? 
In both MM and PP, Kant described achieving the state of peace as a process of 
continual approximation – it is a process of gradually encompassing all states, during 
which several states first form an association to preserve peace, providing a focus 
point for other states to join at liberty; later there are more than one of these 
associations, more states join them, and through these associations the union 
gradually extends further then finally becomes universal. 81  Kant repeated in his 
works that it is all states’ obligation and immediate duty to join the federal union in 
order to establish the state of peace82; yet during the process of approaching this ideal, 
 
79 Ibid., p. 81 (AA, 8:357).  
80 Ibid., p. 80 (AA, 8:356).  
81 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (AA, 8:356); Kant, 1996 (1797)., p. 119 – 120 (AA, 6:350 – 351).  
82 Kant, 1996 (1797)., p 114 (AA, 6:344); Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 80 (AA, 8:356).  
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it is voluntary (arbitrary) for states to join the associations that ultimately extend into 
the universal union that Kant called congress. Kant also emphasized that both these 
associations of states and the federal union can be dissolved or renounced at any time. 
Recall that Kantian nonideal theory allows middle grounds between full-scale 
implementation of moral requirements and the complete surrender of them; Horn’s 
interpretation of Kant’s recognition of the possibility of morality being improved or 
progressing through law is direct evidence for Kant’s proposition on the gradual 
approximation of the ideal morality in nonideal circumstances. Pauline Kleingeld also 
contended that the core of Kant’s argument regarding the full realization of perpetual 
peace should be pursued mediately, via the voluntary establishment of a league, and 
not via premature attempts to institutionalize a state of states immediately.83 We could 
deduce from the above that in-between stages are allowed also for states when they 
are advancing towards the universal state of peace, in a way that they can join at 
liberty the federal union at their own discretion, according to their own conditions. 
Therefore the international system could be in such a stage that some states have 
joined one of the associations while some remain in state of nature; or states have 
joined an association yet they renounced their decisions later due to imperative 
reasons. These two situations in international system could be called a “partial state of 
nature”, which is a middle-ground stage between state of nature and universal union 
of states.  
We could further deduce that because it is obligated for all states to leave the state 
of nature, those who joined the union should be seen as in a more advanced stage of 
morality than those who have not yet joined. For those who have not joined, they are 
still in the state of nature, in relation to the others who have not joined and those who 
are members of the union. For the members, they are in state of peace within the 
union, yet they are in state of nature with the outsiders, thus they are not completely 
safe from attacks. Therefore, in partial state of nature, the rights of states change 
according to the related status a state is in with the others: for members of the union, 
they are obligated to keep peace within the union and settle disputes in a civil way, 
they have the right to go to war and to prepare to go to war with the outsider states; 
for the outsider states, they are obligated to move towards joining the union and they 
have their rights in state of nature with other states including the union members.  
 
83 Kleingeld, 2004. p. 318.  
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Partial state of nature would be more appropriate for describing our current 
international system than either state of nature or universal federal union of states. 
There are associations of states like EU and ASEAN, that aim at facilitating and 
enhancing corporation and connection among states; there are alliances of states like 
UN and NPT, that aim at solving one specific global problem or global problems in 
general. Yet they are either not strong enough to settle all disputes among states and 
peoples, or they are not just enough to settle them in a way that convinces every party. 
Either way, acute and fundamental conflicts of interests exist among states and 
peoples that cause skirmishes, clashes, or even wars internationally. International 
trade is another strong tie that weaves states into a web and pulls them away from 
arbitrary wars with each other. Yet the fundamental difference between Kantian ideal 
federal union of states and the trade-tied international society which is our current 
world, is that Kant repeatedly identified the former as dissolvable at any time and to 
be joined voluntarily and at liberty; yet the latter is like a tide swept across the world 
that pervades states regardless of their free will.   
From above we knew that for states in partial state of nature, their rights of states 
change according to their relative status with each other. For a union that is aimed to 
seek perpetual peace, one of the defining indicators of a member would be its 
involvement of war – has it waged war or threatened to wage war against other states? 
Has it been actively engaged itself in the preparation of warfare? Has it been involved 
in ongoing war(s)? When a state is involved in war(s) in any way, it cannot be within 
the union; it is thus, in the state of nature with all others; therefore, it has the right to 
go to war, right of prevention, and right of national defence.  
 
3.3. Kantian Nonideal Theory on National Defence  
    After addressing the domestic analogies problem and the state of nature problem, 
we can return to Kant’s stand on national defence. There are three caveats we should 
be aware with his stand. First, the lesser power must have genuinely perceived threats 
of aggression in order for it to invoke the right of prevention and the right of self-
defence, any act of private vengeance or enmity or interests seeking in the name of 
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self-defence is proscribed. 84  However, it is difficult for others to examine the 
authenticity of the lesser power’s perception for it is subjective, hence there should be 
concrete evidence of such threats. Second, there should be substantial evidence 
indicating the increase of the other state’s power being potentially aggressive 
therefore menacing. Third, no act of hostility is justified if it would destroy the mutual 
trust among states in a future period of peace.85 Doyle suggested that viewing from 
some historical events, the mass destruction of nuclear weapons is not hostile enough 
to be absolutely proscribed from use in Kantian terms.86 Yet it is important to note 
that the perception of hostility sufficiently vicious to hinder future pacific possibilities 
is susceptible to culture, religious beliefs, ideology, and historical backgrounds among 
specific nations – to list a few – it could be contingent for atomic mass destruction to 
be deemed as such act.  
Subsequently comes two questions: If the unannounced preparations are discovered 
by the superior power, does the maxim of this action resemble the maxim of political 
prudence being declared publicly, therefore should be rendered unjust, for 
undertaking preparations is a showing of intension to go to war? Should the 
preparations be rendered unjust because it might be considered menacing increase of 
power in a third state’s perspective? For a state to go to war first due to the concerns 
that it might have to go to war later is absurd for its action makes the probability a 
certainty. Yet undertaking preparations, even discovered by others, does not 
necessarily make war a certainty. As long as the state genuinely perceived threat of 
aggression from another state and there is concrete evidence to support such threat, 
preparations for war taken by threatened state should be considered legitimate based 
on its right of prevention and right of self-defence. And it should not be seen as 
menace because it is merely a rational reaction from a state confronted by a threat of 
war; and the entire purpose of such preparation should only be in response of such 
threat.   
In this chapter we discussed Kant’s duty of self-defence and its national analogies – 
Kant permits personal lethal self-defence on the culprit only when one’s life is under 
attack. The national analogy of such duty is that national defence can best be seen as a 
 
84 Doyle, 2010. p. 100 
85 Kant, 2006 (1795)., p. 70 (AA, 8 :346).  
86 Doyle, 2010. p.  100. Note 21.  
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reciprocal relation; and lying in the form of nuclear deterrence as a means for national 
defence is morally permitted in the perspective of Kantian nonideal theory when 
dealing with a deceiver. International relations in our current world, according to 
Kantian nonideal theory, can be seen as in partial state of nature, in which rights of 
states differ according to the relative status of state in question with another. If a state 
has direct involvement of war(s), it is to be seen as in state of nature with all others; 
and it has the right to go to war and right of prevention, which means it can take 
preparation when genuinely perceived threat of war; and there should be substantial 
evidence for such threat. For nuclear deterrence, any act that would destroy the 
mutual trust that is needed to establish a future in peace is to be proscribed. 
Conclusively, Kantian nonideal theory permits a state to undertake preparation of 
equivalent force with which it was threatened, including nuclear deterrence, under the 
condition that no action shall be taken if it makes establishing peaceful future 
impossible.  
 
3.4. Acquiring and Stockpiling Nuclear Weapons 
    In the case of being threatened with nuclear attack, it is permissible for the 
threatened state to undertake preparation of entering a nuclear war, which would 
mean acquiring and stockpiling nuclear weapons, exert deterrent threats, and the 
actual using of nuclear weapons. Kantian nonideal theory has significant restraints on 
the actual use of atomic destructive force, yet what is the boundary for acquiring and 
stockpiling nuclear weapons, and that of exerting nuclear deterrence in the perspective 
of Kantian nonideal theory? 
    As Nye enumerated in his five maxims of nuclear ethics, nuclear weapons cannot 
be treated as conventional weapons in any way. 87 For the long-term and destructive 
effects radioactive material can do to humans, nature, and ecosystem, the moral 
guidance for acquiring, handling, and stockpiling nuclear weapons should be 
emphasized; and the ability to abide by such guidance should have determining 
implications on the moral judgement of whether the threatened state is permissible to 
acquire nuclear ability.  
 
87 Nye, 1986. Chapter 7.  
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    Recall that the right of necessity dictates it is not inculpable but only unpunishable 
to harm the innocent in order to save one’s life; not to harm the innocent is an 
unconditional duty while saving one’s own life is a conditional duty. Therefore 
harming the innocent is considered a violation of duty, may it be done in purpose or in 
accident. Hence it is a duty for the actor to take necessary measures to avoid the 
violation of duty from happening, in the process of seeking its own end. In the process 
of acquiring, handling, and stockpiling nuclear weapons, the acquiring state is obliged 
to acquire the techniques or measures for properly managing the radioactive material, 
and for effectively preventing any leakage or accident. It is also morally obligated for 
the acquiring state to store and deploy the weapons in a way that accidental or 
unauthorized triggering is highly unlikely, which includes measures like physical 
proceedings to prevent missile launch that would take several hours to reverse, 
separating warheads from delivery systems that would take even longer time to 
reverse. 88 It is also nuclear aspirant’s duty to take necessary precautions to prevent its 
nuclear command and control (NC2) system from getting highjacked or manipulated 
at any point. 89   
However, in a non-ideal circumstance, where the nuclear aspirant has no way of 
acquiring such technique or measures, or the technique or measures acquired is not 
enough to prevent harm being done to the innocent, would such situation influence the 
moral permissibility of the aspirant’s acquisition of nuclear ability? In the process of 
acquisition, handling, and stockpiling of nuclear device, it would render the process 
morally impermissible if any kind of direct harm was done to or will inevitably be 
done to a human life of whom did not give rational consent to sacrifice his/her life for 
said process, or there is no reason to believe that s/he will give such consent.90 While 
it is absolutely forbidden to harm innocent lives, it might be necessary sometimes to 
put them at risk91, as long as the aspirant state only intends to do good and has done 
what could be done to prevent harming the innocent.  
 
3.5. Nuclear Deterrence: On Militaries and On Civilians 
 
88 Ritchie, 2014. p. 612 
89 Fritz, 2009. p. 7, p. 16.  
90 Wood, 2009. p.249. n16.  
91 Doyle, 2010. pp. 98 – 99.  
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    Let’s now focus on exerting deterrence. According to Doyle’s inference of Kantian 
nonideal theory regarding nuclear deterrence and defence, the nuclear Aspirant (the 
threatened state) is morally permitted  to  deter with nuclear attack against the military 
centers of the Rival (the threatening state); and carry out the nuclear deterrence with 
significant constraints on only military centers when it is under nuclear attack.92 As 
for levying nuclear deterrent threats against Rival’s government and population 
centers, in addition to military center, Doyle suggested it is impermissible even the 
Aspirant has no intension of carrying out the deterrence. 93  He reasoned that a 
convincing nuclear deterrent threat would activate the Rival’s hostility and 
consequently make trust building difficult. Such action contradicts with Kant’s Sixth 
Preliminary Article in PP and it is therefore not permissible. Doyle then deemed his 
judgement to be “not a necessary one” in the foot note, as suggested otherwise by the 
continuing peace between the U.S. and Japan after the nuclear bombing of population 
centers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
    The logical deduction appears impeccable at first glance. Yet from the nuclear 
weapon delivery mechanisms currently available we could know that it is often 
difficult for the Rival to know which target the Aspirant is threatening when the 
nuclear weapon is in strategic deterrent stage, especially if the (allied) Rival state(s) 
and the (allied) Aspirant state(s) are neighboring states or within the same region. It is 
only after the warhead had been loaded into the delivery system and ready for launch, 
can it be deduced what it might be targeting according to the property of the delivery 
system; and only when it aims at the target will this deduction becomes more certain. 
Therefore in nuclear deterrence stage, the Rival can only assume that the Aspirant’s 
nuclear deterrent threat is targeting (a) general targets, including both military and 
civilian centers, (b) only military centers, and (c) only civilian centers. The situation 
of scenario (a) is identical with determining the mere action of acquiring nuclear 
weapons is hostile enough to make mutual trust impossible, which has been disproved 
above; therefore if the Rival assumes the deterrence is generally aimed, the mutual 
trust should not be damaged to an unredeemable extent. Nuclear deterrent threat 
aiming for military centers is proven above to be not among the actions of mutual-
trust breaking, thus in the case of scenario (b) the mutual trust would be maintained. 
 
92 Doyle, 2010. pp. 103 – 106. 
93 Ibid., p. 107. 
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In scenario (c) however, to target only population centers can be considered an action 
of extermination for it is not an action to assert one’s right by means of violence but 
an action of annihilation, suggesting enmity and vicious hostility. For the Rival to 
assume the Aspirant would ignore the option of targeting military centers and only to 
target government and population centers, the Rival would have some established 
understandings of the Aspirant’s manner of thinking, which renders the Aspirant is 
vengeful. In that case, mutual trust has already broken beyond repair before the 
nuclear deterrent threat is posed, therefore breaking mutual trust through threatening 
government and population centers is inapplicable in scenario (c). Therefore, in the 
situation where the nuclear deterrent choice is no way to be known for sure, the 
judgement of the threats leading to an irreversible breaking of mutual trust is either 
disproved or inapplicable.  
    In the situation where the Rival can distinguish the target(s) the Aspirant is 
threatening even when the weapon is in strategic deterrent stage; or the Aspirant loads 
the nuclear warhead to specific delivery system and aims, constituting an imminent 
deterrence situation, there are two scenarios which either (d) the Aspirant threatens 
only the military centers, or (e) it threatens both military and civilian centers, for the 
intentional threats posed on both and on only population centers would convey the 
same level of enmity. The circumstance of scenario (d) is equivalent to scenario (b), 
hence mutual trust would be sustained. Scenario (e) on the other hand, shows the 
promise to harm noncombatant civilians which might infuriate the Rival and 
deteriorate mutual trust beyond redemption. In plain terms, in all the scenarios of the 
Aspirant threatens the Rival with nuclear strike which the Aspirant secretly would 
never carry out, only when the Rival can specify unambiguously the threatened target 
includes its civilian centers, might it be enraged and would therefore jeopardize the 
mutual trust between the two states for their future peace. Therefore, whether 
threatening civilians conveys sufficiently vicious hostility to make mutual trust 
impossible is considered one of the possible determining factors of making a valid 
Kantian nonideal assessment of whether the Aspirant is permissible to threaten the 
Rival’s civilian centers. 
However, making mutual trust impossible is something hard to assess precisely. 
Recollect that mutual trust between states or among states within a region is 
susceptible to culture, religious beliefs, historical backgrounds, and ideologies, among 
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other factors. Kant stipulates breaking mutual trust to be morally proscribed due to the 
reason that doing so makes it impossible for states to enter the federal union of states 
which guarantee a perpetual peace. Yet it is argued above that according to Kantian 
nonideal theory, from state of nature to perpetual peace is a long process, there are in-
between stages; therefore whether one action has made the mutual trust impossible 
can only be determined when it comes to the state of perpetual peace. Thus breaking 
mutual trust can only be assessed in a provisional status; and the broken mutual trust 
can only be rendered as provisionally broken. Therefore it is unconvincing to assess 
one action as morally prohibited based solely on breaking mutual trust.  
If the effects of threatening civilians on mutual trust are inconclusive, there is 
another possible factor which could determine the moral permissibility of such action. 
“(M)orality permits states to do that which is otherwise impermissible in order to 
prevent greater injustices from happening. ” 94  Although this thesis might be too 
utilitarian to be derived from Kant, it is a moral guidance suitable for nonideal 
circumstances; combining it with Doyle’s interpretation of Kantian non-ideal theory 
on risking humanity’s rights in the pursuit of legitimate self-defence and we have this: 
Kantian non-ideal theory permits states to risk breaking mutual trust in order to 
prevent injustice that is greater than risking the breaking of said mutual trust. Kant 
specified it as the Sixth Preliminary Article in PP for the perpetual peace between 
states that “no state shall allow itself such hostilities in wartime as would make 
mutual trust in a future period of peace impossible.”95 In the following paragraph he 
further explicated that “there must remain…some degree of trust in the enemy’s 
manner of thinking, since otherwise no peace could possibly be reached, and 
hostilities would degenerate into a war of extermination.”96 Down a few lines he 
reiterated “it is clear that the means named above would inevitably lead to such a war 
of extermination” 97 , and from context we learnt that “the means named above” 
include all the behaviors that would render mutual trust in future peace impossible, 
which Kant utterly prohibits with this Article. We can therefore know that the actions 
Kant proscribes are the sufficient condition for a war of extermination – they make a 
war of extermination unavoidable. And from Kant’s text we could see that the 
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resulting of the extermination of all rights and all established institutions, along with 
the mass destruction of humanity was the main reason for the proscription of these 
actions – “…both parties and, moreover, all right can be eradicated simultaneously, 
could bring about perpetual peace only over the great graveyard of humanity. Such a 
war, therefore, and hence the use of the means which would lead to it, must be utterly 
forbidden.”98 
From the inference above, the previous proposition could be revised into such: In 
the non-ideal circumstances, states are permitted to risk initiating a war of 
extermination in order to prevent injustice that is greater than risking a war of 
extermination. What could be an injustice that is greater than risking a war of 
extermination? The most direct answer would probably be the definite happening of a 
war of extermination. Therefore, small rectification could be done to our proposition: 
In the non-ideal circumstances, states are permitted to risk initiating a war of 
extermination in order to prevent the definite happening of a war of extermination.  
    Doyle’s theory of risking to harm humanity for the sake of exercising the right of 
self-defence can also find its root in one of the paradox identified by Greg Kavka in 
his work Some Paradoxes of Deterrence 99 , where Kavka presupposed a special 
deterrent situation (SDS)100 in which a nation N makes a nuclear deterrence believing 
it to be the only reliable means to prevent nuclear attack, while secretly having 
conclusive moral reasons not to carry out the deterrence when the deterrence fails, 
which is similar to the nuclear deterrent case in this dissertation. Kavka identified 
three paradoxes in a special deterrent situation and analyzed the moral perspective 
that accepts all and the one that rejects all.101 Then he introduced a middle-ground 
position that seeks to accommodate the valid insights of both perspectives, which 
signifies the distinction between harms and risks, and deems prohibitions of risks as 
unreasonable.102 We could see that Kavka agreed with the position that uses nuclear 
deterrence to prevent war is morally permitted and preferred, even if the actors would 
need to compromise their virtue integrity by corrupting their intentions and means of 
action.  
 
98 Ibid.  
99 Doyle, 2015., p. 857.  
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Hence a non-ideal Kantian assessment of the Aspirant threatening the Rival’s 
civilians with a nuclear attack that is never to be actually carried out comes as such: 
the Aspirant is not permitted to threaten distinctively the Rival’s civilians with a 
nuclear attack which the Aspirant secretly intends to not carry out, unless the Aspirant 
believes it is the only thing to do to prevent a war of extermination.  
Table 1 below summarized the moral assessments of different scenarios discussed 
above, and the condition(s) they are under:  
 
 
Assumption / Strategic Deterrence Specific Threat / Imminent Deterrence 
Target type Exert 
deterrence 





Carry out when 
deterrence fails 
Military + Civilian √ / Military + Civilian ? × 
Military √ √* Military √ √* 
Civilian / / Civilian Same as “Military + Civilian” 
* can only be carried out under nuclear attack(s);  
? not permitted unless it is the only means to prevent a war of extermination. 
Table 1.  
 
Going back to the three deterrent paradoxes identified by Kavka, paradox 1 (P1) 
presented a moral assessment identical with the Kantian nonideal assessment made 
above regarding the Aspirant threatens the Rival with a nuclear attack which the 
Aspirant secretly decides to never carry out.103 The other two paradoxes, P2 and P3 
from Kavka’s work, can be associated with the moral assessments on making the 
deterrence more credible. In the explication of paradox 2 (P2) and its instantiation  
Kavka indicated that under the situation of which it would be right for actors to form 
 
103 Ibid, pp. 288 – 291.  
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the intention to carry out the deterrence once it fails, some actors can form such 
intention and some cannot. The ones who cannot are the rational and moral ones.104 
The dilemma for assessing nuclear deterrence under such situation, is that no one 
except the Aspirant itself can know for sure whether the Aspirant formed the intention 
or not, until the deterrence has failed and has been carried out. All the deterrent 
actions the Aspirant did could be acts to make the deterrence more convincing, also 
could be real preparation for nuclear attack. From Kantian nonideal perspective, it is 
conditionally morally permitted for the Aspirant to threaten the Rival with nuclear 
attack only when the Aspirant never intends to follow through with the attack, which 
means that the Aspirant never actually succeed in forming the intention to execute the 
attack. From Kavka, we can know that the ground of the desire to form the intention is 
and should be seen as completely distinct from the desire to go through with it.105 
With this distinction it is possible for the intention of reciprocate the nuclear attack to 
be morally proscribed while the intention of intending to reciprocate as a means of 
deterrence could be morally permitted.  Hence, the Aspirant’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, along with its actions to facilitate the operationality of the nuclear weapons, 
together with other actions that increase the credibility of the deterrence could be 
morally permitted if the Aspirant intends them as and only as a means of deterrence.  
 
 
4. National Defence and North Korea Nuclear Security Complex 
 
4.1. The De Facto At-War Status, The Nuclear Threat, and The Life Threats 
    How does the moral assessment in the stance of Kantian nonideal theory look like 
for the noticeable practices in North Korean Nuclear Security Complex? The most 
salient and fundamental assessment should be the morality of North Korea’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. According to propositions suggested above, in partial 
state of nature like the current international system, a state should be involved in 
war(s), and be threatened substantially by nuclear attacks to be morally permitted to 
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acquire nuclear weapons for national defence.  
The most direct prove of involvement in war(s) for North Korea is the fact that 
there is no peace treaty signed between it and the United States after the ceasefire of 
the Korean War; an armistice agreement was signed instead and no peace treaty has 
ever been established, which leaves the situation between North Korea and the United 
States technically still at war with each other to this day. Hence we can acknowledge 
the state of nature status between North Korea and both the United States and South 
Korea.  
 Furthermore, aside from technicality, the de facto situation between the US and 
North Korea has not been peaceful – the US abrogated the Armistice Agreement in 
the beginning of 1958 by deploying at least four nuclear weapon systems in South 
Korea, including one surface-to-surface missile system.106 From the first deployment 
to 1961, there were seven different nuclear weapon systems and 600 nuclear warheads 
deployed in South Korea107  – including the Sergeant missile system with 130km 
maximum range, and nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers which could do damage 
further into North Korean territory108. During 1976 to 1981, there are a total of 35 
visits of ballistic missile submarines carrying nuclear warheads, to South Korean port 
Chinhae109. The presence of nuclear warheads did not cease to exist until 1991, at the 
brink of the dissolution of Soviet Union, U.S president G.W.H. Bush announced the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiative, which signified the full withdrawal of nuclear weapons 
on South Korea territory. Throughout the whole 33 years during which the US 
deployed nuclear capability in South Korea, the number of nuclear warheads peaked 
at 950 in 1967, 640 at 1974, gradually cut down to 150 at 1982, before South Korean 
President Roh Tae Woo publicly declared the full withdrawal of nuclear weapons at 
late 1991, there were around 100 warheads in South Korean territory. And during 
most of this 33-year period, fighter-bombers with tactical nuclear bombs were within 
range of quick strike of North Korea, and at some point covering the range of Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Vladivostok. 110  This was the first and the long-lasted substantial 
nuclear threat against North Korea. 
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After the Korean War, North Korea was in a state of near total destruction, 
especially in economic and industrial bases. In urgent need for rehabilitation, and 
being a friendly member of the Socialist community, North Korea relied deeply on the 
“big brother” Soviet Union and the “comrade-in-arms and close friend” China on 
economic aid and ideological leadership.111 Yet as Kim Il Sung gradually established 
his Juche ideology in state governing, the ideological gap between North Korea and 
Soviet Union and the rest of the Socialist community became wider and wider.112 The 
partition of ideology and the firm will of independence caused North Korea’s decision 
to keep an arm’s length with the S.U. during the 1960s. 113 Although being “comrade-
in-arms sharing weal and woe”, China is itself in economic difficulties since the Great 
Famine during late 1950s and early 1960s. Plus though China did its best to assist 
North Korea, its limited capability along with the increase demand from other 
communist and “third-world” countries made it unable to keep up with the growing 
needs of North Korea. 114 During the second half of 1960s, as the Cultural Revolution 
commenced, China’s foreign policy became more radical and more antagonistic 
towards North Korea’s fence-sitting attitude regarding the Sino-Soviet polemics. The 
fall out between the two former comrades persisted until end of 1960s. 115 
The foreign policy priority of Soviet Union started to shift from Sino-Soviet 
conflict to Soviet-U.S. detente, reducing Soviet’s need of North Korea, which led to 
the Soviet lack of attention to North Korea during most of the 1970s. Another major 
factor for Soviet-DPRK alienation during the 70s was Kim Il Sung’s leadership – his 
enhanced personality cult and his state ideology Juche which embedded into North 
Korean constitution diverged the two countries even further. 116  From Kim’s 
perspective, both Khrushchev in the 1960s and Brezhnev in the 1970s to 1984 were 
“revisionists”117; thus fundamental diverge from revolutionary ideology boasted by 
Kim elucidated him that the Soviets were not to be trusted as a reliable ally. On the 
other hand, the strategic posture of China also changed during the 1970s, as de-
emphasized revolutionary diplomacy became a key component to China’s external 
relations, Sino-U.S détente heated up even more after Nixon’s ice-breaking visit to 
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China in 1972. China’s preference for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula has been growing stronger by time118; and that opposed with Kim’s initial 
idea of military reunification relying on the help from the Soviet Union or China. 
Observing China’s fundamental division with the Soviets since the mid 1950s, along 
with the progress of normalization of relations between China and the U.S., 
culminating by the formal establishment of Sino-U.S diplomatic relations in 1979, 
Kim gradually realized that China has walked further away from the revolutionary 
track, and can hardly be recognized as the steadfast same-minded comrade anymore.  
North Korea has therefore stepped into a security dilemma right after the armistice 
– it was at war and hostile with the United States; it was constantly threatened by 
nuclear attacks; its vision of militarily reunifying South Korea had been perceived by 
the U.S. and South Korea; yet both the Soviet Union and China – the two crucial 
helpers without whom it cannot realize the reunification, had been rendered not trust-
worthy. North Korea was stuck in a way that from the U.S.’s perspective it was 
supposed to be under the security umbrella of the communist community, and it will 
conquer South Korea by force the first chance it has, with the firm backing from the 
Soviets and China; therefore the U.S. was convinced that nuclear deterrence was 
necessary for South Korea’s protection. However, from North Korea’s perception, its 
dream of reunification by force drifted further as the fundamental divergence wedged 
between both China and the Soviet Union, and itself; it was forced onto a path of 
becoming arch enemy with the U.S. without backup from any ally. Hence, its only 
logical and reliable option for national survival was nuclear capability. And according 
to its situation during 1953 to end of 1970s, it was morally permitted for North Korea 
to acquire nuclear weapons from the perspective of Kantian nonideal theory.  
 
4.2. Three Tools of War 
Along with the signing of Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, Sino-U.S. 
relations normalization, relations between North Korea and China were becoming 
more and more strained, while North Korea-Soviet ties grew stronger during the first 
half of 1980s.119 From the mid-1980s, as China worked toward détente with South 
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Korea, and participated the Asian Games and Olympics held in Seoul in 1986 and 
1988 respectively, North Korea leaned further toward the Soviets, establishing closer 
security ties and securing shipments of weapons and goods to North Korea. Yet the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 signified the loss of North Korea’s most 
important security patron and economic partner; 120  and also the loss of the one 
country that might defend North Korea with nuclear force if the U.S. attacks.  
In order to counter the chronical nuclear threat exerted by the United States and to 
maintain self-reliance and independent as the Juche ideology dictates, North Korea 
sought to develop its own nuclear capability since the 1960s. The early development 
of nuclear program was focused on nuclear power plant, which was excessively 
dependent on the Soviets, yet since North Korea upgraded its soviet-supplied nuclear 
reactor to 8 MW in 1974, its path of nuclear development has become more 
independent. Another important factor pushing North Korea’s nuclear motivation 
dated back to 1953, when U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower launched his “Atoms for 
Peace” campaign, through which Washington facilitate various countries with 
scientific and technological support to develop their own nuclear capability, recipients 
including South Korea. 121 Although Washington continuously blocked South Korean 
attempts to develop nuclear military potential since 1969, the repeated efforts South 
Korean made worried Pyongyang. 122 Since 1958, shortage of energy has become a 
constant problem for North Korea, which is one of the major reasons for its eager to 
get help from the Soviets for its nuclear power plant. Yet the Soviet leadership kept 
rejecting North Korea’s requests for a nuclear power plant, while attempted to 
increase the price for the oil they export to North Korea. 123 Kremlin was selectively 
helping its satellite states on gaining civil nuclear capability – selecting criteria seem 
to include advanced technological level, political loyalty, controllability, and 
rectification of the NPT. 124  As a technologically underdeveloped, diplomatically 
fence-sitting state that persists on self-reliance and independence, North Korea is 
obviously not on USSR’s favorite ally list. Moreover, most of the nuclear reactors the 
Soviets undertook for their satellite states were light-water reactors – they are 
dependent on Soviet supplies of enriched uranium as fuel; and they are less preferable 
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when developing military capability. It can be reasonably assumed that Kremlin 
attempted to control its satellites states further via monopolizing both nuclear fuel 
supply and nuclear military capability. For North Korea, dual nuclear capability was 
the best option to prevent being exploited by its nominal ally and staying independent, 
while develop its own defence power towards hostility.   
Recall Kantian nonideal theory indicated that the extent of national defence should 
range from effective minimum to the bound of reciprocity. According to Kant’s three 
tools of war – military power, the power of alliances, and the power of money125, 
North Korea is not in the advantage of any at any time, compared to the United States. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the allies DPRK had were more nominal than 
reliable and practical; after the dissolution of USSR, Russia – DPRK relations went 
through an after-shock of distance and coldness during the decade of 1990s. Since the 
late 1970s the North Korean economy had been going downhill, the rigid adherence 
of Juche socialism had led to a fundamental resistance of any economic or political 
reforms in North Korea, making the “socialist paradise” suffered from consecutive 
years of economic decline; North Korea’s GNP, once on a par with that of South 
Korea, shrunk into one sixth of the GNP of the latter in early 1990s. 126 Therefore, for 
the national defence to be effective, nuclear deterrence is not only permitted but also 
necessary for North Korea at that point. 
 
4.3. Pushed Further On The Path 
DPRK’s attempt to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 is believed to be induced by 
several factors – the economic trouble it was in; the constant energy shortage it 
suffered; the extreme insecurity caused by the dissolution of USSR and the 
“communist camp”. At the same time as its announcement of withdrawal of the NPT, 
Pyongyang made it clear that this nuclear issue could be resolved at a high-level 
meeting between the United States and North Korea. 127  Via this measure of 
brinkmanship, North Korea was hoping to get the chance to sit down with the United 
States and work towards normalization of their bilateral relations, resolving the 
fundamental security threat that constantly looms over it, which is the hostile status 
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with and the nuclear deterrence from the U.S.  
North Korea got its high-level talks with the U.S. at June 1993, meanwhile war 
threat from the U.S. had never stopped – as the negotiations were stuck, Washington 
reportedly undertook detailed planning for an air strike on DPRK’s key nuclear 
complex, even though this would most likely trigger a full-scale war on the Peninsula. 
128 After many twists and turns, the Agreed Framework was signed at late 1994. The 
Framework stipulated U.S. to undertake the construction of  two light-water reactors 
for the North, and to compensate the North’s energy lost in the form of heavy oil; in 
exchange for North Korea to halt the operations and infrastructure development of its 
nuclear program, accept IAEA inspection and supervision.129 Yet the Framework was 
meant to go beyond a non-proliferation tool, it called for both sides to move toward 
full normalization of political and economic relations. 130 For Pyongyang, the light-
water reactor construction process was a token secured for a long-term U.S.-DPRK 
engagement and willingness to relax trading restrictions131, and the Framework was 
seen as a platform, within which the related parties establish new norms for 
interaction and cooperation, and work towards normalization of relations. 132As for 
the United States, the Framework was merely a non-proliferation tool, even an 
unwelcome and controversial one – since the Republicans seized control of the U.S. 
Congress at November 1994, criticisms and skepticism regarding the Framework had 
flooded Washington and caused the implementation of the Framework hobbling. 133 
The implementation of the Framework lagged behind schedule tremendously due to 
various reasons from the beginning – the LWR site construction was postponed 
several time caused by the delays in production cost sharing talks between 
contributing countries of the project; heavy oil shipments were delayed due to the 
constant rejection from the U.S. Congress. 134 The Framework barely survived for 
four years, as North Korea was getting more frustrated and disappointed due to more 
delays in both LWR construction and heavy oil delivery, it launched the Taepodong 
missile despite U.S. warnings at August 1998135, leading to U.S. Congress cutting its 
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heavy oil provision. 136  The Framework almost immediately went moribund as 
George. W. Bush was elected the U.S. president. Bush’s administration took an “ABC” 
(Anything but Clinton) approach to foreign policy and North Korea policy bore the 
brunt. 137 Bush announced his list of “Axis of Evil” at the beginning of 2001 and U.S.-
DPRK relations took a nose dive. The Framework withered further as the United 
States and North Korea accuse each other of cheating and non-compliance. The 
recriminations led to the US suspension of heavy oil shipments and LWR construction, 
and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, effectively killed the Framework in 
spirit and substance. 138 The subsequent Iraq War disillusioned the North – not only 
normalizing relations with the U.S. was a distant dream, if the North does not possess 
nuclear weapon soon it could become the next Iraq. North Korea was therefore 
pushed further on the path of developing nuclear military capability.  
 
4.4. Moral Assessment of North Korea’s Current Practice 
First we need to assess the morality for North Korea to employ lying in the form of 
nuclear deterrence as a means of national defence. Recall that it is permissible to lie to 
a deceiver in an evil, nonideal circumstance so that one and one’s moral integrity 
would not be used as a means. It can be deduced that North Korea is permitted to 
exert nuclear deterrence as a means of national defence, if nuclear deterrence is seen 
as a form of lie and North Korea is being deceived to. Currently there are seven states 
in the world that have officially declared having operational nuclear military 
capability besides North Korea, and one state – Israel – that has never officially 
declared but is highly suspected to have nuclear military capability. Further, there are 
five states that are in possession of nuclear weapons via NATO nuclear sharing 
system, though the operational control of these weapons remains in the hands of the 
United States. 139  The seven nuclear military capable states are exerting nuclear 
deterrence to the rest of the world, and can be seen as lying in the form of nuclear 
deterrence. And the five NATO states can be seen as potential deceivers on nuclear 
deterrence in their respective regions. In the context of North Korean Nuclear 
Security Complex, the United States exerts nuclear deterrence particularly to North 
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Korea as they are in de-facto at-war status. Under the deception in the form of nuclear 
deterrence, North Korea should be permitted to deceive in the form of nuclear 
deterrence, so that its freedom would not subject to coercion and its honesty would 
not be used as a means.  
The actual acquisition of nuclear military capability was in the late 1990s when 
North Korea got from Pakistani nuclear physicist A.Q. Khan the uranium enrichment 
technologies and centrifuge needed for extraction of more bomb material. 140 With the 
first successful underground detonation of a plutonium based device, North Korea 
achieved its nuclear capability in 2006. In mid-2009, the North conducted its second 
nuclear test – a more powerful explosion than the first test; four years later in 2013, 
the third nuclear test was carried out. The fourth and fifth test happened in 2016; 
Pyongyang claimed them to be the first successful hydrogen bomb explosion and first 
nuclear warhead test explosion respectively. The last test to this day was in September 
2017, when North Korea claimed to successfully have detonated a hydrogen bomb; 
the corresponding yield report suggested the blast to be around ten times more 
powerful than the previous nuclear tests.  
As for nuclear delivery systems, the backbone of North Korean current deterrence 
consists of close-range ballistic missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and medium-
range ballistic missiles (MRBM) which has an operational range of 1,200 – 1,500 km; 
as the most reliable ballistic missile system for the North at this moment, it can reach 
any target in South Korea and most of Japan. 141  The North test-launched three 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) at May, August, and September 2017 
respectively, estimated range between 3,000 to 4,500 km. 142 American installations 
on Guam – a site of a major air base and logistics hub – are well within range of these 
IRBMs. North Korea had two test launches of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles 
(ICBM) in July 2017, demonstrating a top range of 10, 400 km which brings Alaska, 
Hawaii and more than half of mainland U.S. soil within striking range. 143  On 
November 29th, 2017 North Korea test-launched its largest and longest-range missile 
yet: the Hwasong-15, which has a maximum range of 13,000 km, sufficient to 
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potentially target all of the United States. 144 However, all the successful test launches 
of ICBM failed to demonstrate North Korea boasts the ability to build a re-entry 
vehicle for the protection of the missile’s warhead yet; if the re-entry vehicle fails, the 
payload of the missile is likely to break up upon reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. 145 
Other capable delivery systems include light bombers Il-28 which allegedly are 
also able to reach American installations on Guam.146 Yet whether North Korea has 
the intension of pursuing such delivery method is under question. 147 North Korea is 
developing at least one sea-launched ballistic missile Pukkuksong-1, it is carried by a 
Sinpo-class submarine which has only one missile tube. The Pukkuksong-1 was test-
launched in 2016 and reportedly has a range of 1,200 km. 148 
Yet several successful detonations of nuclear bombs and test launches of ballistic 
missiles does not equal North Korea having the capability of conducting precise 
missile strikes with operational nuclear warheads. Incorporating latest assessments 
from intelligence agencies, military and defence agencies, and private institutions 
from both the United States and South Korea, it is safe to assume that North Korea 
have produced fissile material sufficient to build 30 to 60 nuclear weapons. If the 
North was to make nuclear attacks, the Nodong medium-range ballistic missile 
appears to be the most likely to be the form of deliverable nuclear capability. And the 
nuclear warheads would most likely have 10 to 20 kilotons of yield as demonstrated 
in the 2013 and 2016 tests, for a warhead more powerful than that requires more 
fissile material or a special hydrogen fuel. North Korea has yet to demonstrate a 
capability to successfully deliver a fully functioning nuclear weapon on a long-range 
ballistic missile. 149 
From the assessment above we could know that the credible nuclear deterrence 
North Korea can exert at this moment covers all South Korean territory and most of 
Japan. That is to say the North’s deterrence covers both military and civilian centers 
in South Korea and Japan, but only military centers of the U.S. which located in South 
Korea and Japan. As for credible nuclear deterrence to the United States mainland and 
civilian centers, North Korea reached only one out of the four major criteria that must 
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be met – the North has the capability to build a missile that travels that far; but it has 
not yet demonstrated it possesses the technology to build a stable guidance and 
control system for the long-range missile; nor has it showed any reliable re-entry 
vehicle for its ICBMs that can survive the stress and heat generated by missile re-
entry into the Earth atmosphere; plus it is yet to prove any of its purported nuclear 
weapons are nuclear warhead compatible with its ICBMs, or if it boasts the design to 
miniaturize and stabilize the nuclear weapons for such purpose. 150 
Incorporating the conclusions drawn regarding nuclear deterrence morality 
assessment, the nuclear capability and ballistic missile North Korea currently boasts 
cast strategic deterrence to the Rival’s and the Rival’s allies’ military and civilian 
centers; it has not yet posed any imminent deterrence to any of those centers due to 
lack of concrete evidence of possession of fully-functional nuclear warheads for 
ballistic missile. Therefore North Korea’s nuclear capability is so far morally 
permitted, according to Kantian nonideal theory. However, what if North Korea was 
to take one step further on the nuclear deterrence road? Which type(s) of action by 
North Korea would be deemed morally proscribed? It was established before that 
nuclear deterrence against civilian centers would be morally prohibited unless it is the 
only means to prevent a war of extermination. Hence, is the current Northeast Asian 
situation prone to a war of extermination?  
Despite the lobbying voices in Washington and Seoul supporting redeployment of 
nuclear weapon in the Korean Peninsula in the recent decade, there is no nuclear 
weapon deployed in the Peninsula at the moment. For the US – ROK joint military 
exercises that kept going on annually since late 1990s, US President D. Trump had 
announced a suspension on the exercises in 2018; and US Defense Secretary M. Esper 
reiterated an indefinite postponement of the exercises in late 2019. 151  Thus for 
nuclear threats and general military threats, the United States and its allies have lifted 
both of them considerably. For relation normalization, although sanctions against 
North Korea based on Trading with the Enemy Act 1917 (TWEA) were lifted in 2008; 
new sanctions were applied on it in the same year through International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act 1977 (IEEPA) and still in act at this moment. 152 At the first 
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summit between North Korea Chairman Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald 
Trump in 2018, a joint statement was sign to repledge both sides’ commitment to 
“establish new US-DPRK relations”, to “join their efforts to build a lasting and stable 
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, to “commit to recovering POW/MIA 
remains”, and for North Korea to “work toward complete denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula”. 153 However, the progress of the statement was hindered as the 
North Koreas had showed at least eight types of various action to keep up with their 
end of the bargain, while the Americans had only taken one action – the moratorium 
of US-ROK joint military drill. 154 During the second summit in Hanoi, the unrealistic 
demand of fully denuclearization by January 2021 from Trump acted as one of the 
major reasons for the summit to end without any joint statement signed. 155 On this 
account, US-DPRK relations seem to be limping towards normalization, 
notwithstanding the long way ahead.  
With the intertwined anfractuosity of the economic, political, security, and cultural 
relations among states around the globe and within the Northeast Asian region, a war 
of extermination – which involves the people of the country being massacred and the 
country being encroached or divided or occupied – is becoming less and less likely to 
happen. The means of changing an undesirable regime has become more clandestine 
and varies from inducing color revolution, to surgical strike to remove government 
key figures, to instigating peaceful evolution, etc. Even though these are more 
challenging for the targeted government to deal with, they are not means of 
extermination. Nonetheless, surgical strike resembles assassination in Kantian term, 
which once deployed would generate such hostility that makes mutual trust in a future 
period of peace impossible; 156  inducing color revolution or instigating peaceful 
evolution might be a violation of the duty of non-intervention. None of the above 
means of regime reforming is morally permitted in Kantian perspective; however to 
prevent or resist these action being done to a state cannot be seen as a green light for 
said state to cast nuclear deterrence on civilian centers.  
From the rumors regarding surgical strike operations targeting Kim Jong Un, to the 
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drone trike by U.S. that killed the Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani, for North 
Korea, surgical strikes on its leadership especially on its supreme leader is always 
something to worry about. The self-reliance and closed-up political ideology North 
Korea currently taking is considered effectively reducing the possibilities for color 
revolution or peaceful evolution to be induced; but for the North, caution is always 
suggested. Yet any of the above does not constitute a reason for North Korea to exert 
imminent nuclear deterrence to any civilian center in South Korea, Japan, or the 
United States. Therefore, according to Kantian nonideal theory, unless a full-scale war 
or a nuclear war is imminent, North Korea is morally proscribed to test-launch a 
ballistic missile with nuclear warhead; nor it is permitted to demonstrate loading such 
warhead to a ballistic missile or other effective delivery system, exerting threat to 
major cities in South Korea and Japan.  
As for the ICBMs currently under development, is it moral for the North Koreans 
to keep developing the technology until they apprehend it completely? The conclusion 
drawn previously dictates that any ICBM test-launch is morally prohibited if it is 
loaded with a nuclear warhead; also it is prohibited to demonstrate loading nuclear 
warhead onto an ICBM, for it would constitute an imminent nuclear threat to both 
military and civilian centers on U.S. soil, among other potential targets. Therefore, 
when North Korea claimed the September 2016 nuclear test was a missile warhead 
test, and it “finally examined and confirmed the structure and specific features of 
movement of a nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted 
on strategic ballistic rockets”157, North Korea exerted an imminent nuclear threat to 
all the civilian centers within the missile’s range, which is morally prohibited in the 
perspective of Kantian nonideal theory, regardless of whether what North Korea 
claiming was the truth or not. Furthermore, considering the historical context of 2016, 
North Korea was not in any imminent danger of going to war with any state, nor is it 
preventing any war of extermination from happening with the missile warhead test-
launch. Therefore, the 2016 North Korean claimed nuclear missile warhead test-
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5. The Duty of Non-Intervention 
    In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant enumerated the prerequisites for states to enter a 
status of long-term peace, among which the fifth one stipulates that “no state shall 
forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state”158 – also known 
as the duty of non-intervention159. From numerous scholar’s interpretations and from 
Kant’s own explication, we could know that this principle is to be abided by 
irrespective of circumstances, therefore it is a perfect duty.160 To determine whether 
this principle is relevant to the topic of this dissertation, we need to answer a few 
questions first: What is the definition of intervention? What types of intervention are 
there? Is there any circumstance implied by Kant in which interference does not count 
as violation of the duty? Is there any ground on which the action of intervention can 
be justified in Kantian terms? Does any state within the North Korea Nuclear Security 
Complex fit in such exception? Does any state within said complex violated this duty 
in dealing with North Korea nuclear issue?  
 
5.1. Conceptualizing Intervention 
    RJ Vincent attempted to identify the major features of intervention from six 
component parts – actor, target, the activity itself, the types of intervention, purpose, 
and context.161 He listed three features that are the most important to distinguish 
intervention from international political behaviors in general. First is that there are 
two broad destinations for the activity of intervention: the domestic affairs and 
external affairs of a state. And no matter which got intervened, the suffering part will 
be “the authority structure of the state”. 162 Second is coercive interference being a 
distinguishing feature; coerce can be understood as to compel the sovereign will of 
another state; coercive interference could be considered as actions taken to prescribe 
the actions of others. The use or threat of force is sometimes present but not a 
necessity, which could be used as a guide to the incidence of intervention, with crucial 
supplements to note that not every case of interference involving a great power and a 
small power can be automatically identified as coercive interference; and to note that 
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coercive interference can happen in spheres like international economic relations. 163 
Third feature is that intervention is to be distinguished from war. Intervention is to be 
seen as an act of war, though sometimes intervention is undertaken for the purpose of 
avoiding war, therefore it may be a pacific measure which has the possibility of 
upgrading into a war when resistance is present. 164  What worth noticing is that 
intervention can be lawful as much as it can be unlawful165, and also can be moral as 
much as it can be immoral; lawful or moral intervention should not be excluded from 
“the class of events called intervention”. 166  Therefore in this dissertation we are 
trying to determine if there is intervention undertaken by actors in the North Korean 
Nuclear Security Complex that should be deemed as morally impermissible due to the 
violation of the duty of nonintervention in Kantian political philosophical terms.  
    For types of intervention, military intervention may be one, including all types of 
military aid, and the very presence or display of armed force. 167  Economic 
intervention could be another type, including aid with strings attached, and 
conditional contract between developed and underdeveloped states. 168  Jahn 
mentioned economic means – sanctions or restricted interaction with the intervened – 
as a prudent measure of interventionism. 169 Political intervention would be the third 
type, comprises of hostile propaganda disseminated abroad, moral support lent to the 
revolutionary struggle within another state, refused recognition of an established 
government, internal affairs of a member-state of the Commonwealth being discussed 
at a prime minister’s conference by another member. 170 
 
5.2. Cases of Exception and Their Grounds 
    In the explication paragraph of the Fifth Preliminary Article, Kant indicated that it 
would be a different circumstance if a state were divided into two parts through 
internal conflict; each of the parts regards itself independent and claims the whole 
territory of the original state. In such case, if the conflict is decided, an external state 
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can assist one of these parts without being charged of violating its duty of non-
intervention. 171 The reasoning of this thesis lies in the emergence of anarchy in the 
divided state. Other states no longer have duties towards the original regime once the 
state loses its government and constitution and relapses into the state of nature. 172 Yet 
other states still have duties towards the people of the disintegrated state – including 
the duty of non-intervention – their right to “establish a rightful condition”173 for 
themselves and to “unite into a commonwealth”174 should not be intervened in any 
way.  
    Georg Cavallar pointed out another situation under which a regime is denied a 
status of a ‘moral person’, which is when the regime is a totalitarian one by modern 
standards. 175  He argued that even though Kant specified that an imperfect 
constitution is still better than the state of nature, but if the constitution is so imperfect 
or non-existent that it makes the situation of the state no different from anarchy, it 
would have destroyed itself as a moral person. A political system that denies the 
status of personality to a section of the population would have made the relation 
between these humans and the rest of the society and the government a state of 
nature.176 These humans would have no external obligation to the totalitarian regime, 
but a right to rebellion with the aim to establish a rightful condition for themselves. 
Other states would be relieved of any duty towards this regime; they would have 
duties instead towards the people of this regime. 177 Cavallar suggested along this line 
of reasoning that any government that initiates acts ‘that shock the moral conscience 
of mankind’ such as massacres, genocide loses its status of a moral person and thus its 
right of self-determination. The duty of non-intervention would therefore not apply to 
it.  
Can actions of state intervention be justified on any ground? Can a state’s decision 
be intervened on any ground? Numerous liberal or democratic peace literature 
claimed the right of intervention on the ground of protecting human rights or 
advocating peace can find its roots from the work of Kant.178 In response to these 
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claims, Cavallar argued that Kantian non-ideal theory indicated that Kant sees the 
distinction among states as a matter of degree rather than kind179; he does not distinct 
them as republican and non-republican or liberal and non-liberal in his non-ideal 
theory180, the liberal states in modern standards are merely more lawful than the non-
liberals, but not more just181; instead, states should be seen as being located along a 
continuum, which will gradually reform themselves towards a noumenal republic.182 
Therefore, all moral principles should apply equally to “liberal” states as well as the 
“non-liberal” ones. 183  Furthermore, the liberal, Western-style democracies are not 
inherently peaceful184; the “non-liberal” states do not violate the human rights of their 
citizens by default.185 Hence, the claims of intervening non-liberal state to protect 
human rights or establish a more peaceful society do not stand.  
Horn elaborated Kant’s perception on ideal normativity and non-ideal normativity – 
how states should guide themselves and how they should be seen in non-ideal 
normativity. Horn accorded with Cavallar, suggesting that Kant sees injustice as part 
of human’s nature is possible to be opt off through reform via a well-organised 
state186 ; the sovereign is a morally sensitive person, who will remedy normative 
deficits of the existing legal order by looking towards natural law and the idea of 
reason.187 An unjust situation in public legal affairs should be left to persist for as long 
as it takes for it to dissolve itself or for it to be changed through non-violent means by 
way of moderate reforms. And for this a non-ideal normativity is required188; moral 
progress through law is a strong form of non-ideal normativity.189  
Jahn further argued that interaction with one state without its consent constitute 
intervention; and justification of intervention without consent adds up to justification 
of imperialist policies.190 He suggested that what some liberal interpreters of Kant’s 
work advocate economic means – such as sanctions or restricted interaction with 
nonliberal states – as a means of intervention instead of military means is an explicit 
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aim to change the constitution of nonliberal states, thus clearly implies the denial of 
rights of non-intervention for the nonliberal states 191 ; and not only are the 
contemporary liberal approaches not representation and derivation from Kant’s 
principle, they are actually advocating the diametrical opposite of what Kantian moral 
laws put forward. 192 
    From both circumstances discussed above, we could see one key element of the 
non-applicable condition of the duty of nonintervention – the emergence of state of 
nature. As Kant indicated at the beginning of elaboration of the Definitive Articles of 
Perpetual Peace, the state of nature is a state of war that involves a constant threat of 
outbreak of hostilities. It is the opposite of the state of peace and the state of peace 
must be established for achieving perpetual peace among states. 193 Although the state 
of peace should be strived to be restored, it nonetheless does not give right to any 
state to intervene the right of self-determination of others, for it is unjustified to fight 
one violation of rights with another one. 194 According to the law of permissibility195, 
an unjust situation can be let to persist for a while for it to dissolve itself or for it to be 
changed through moderate reform. 196 These injustice situations are only provisional, 
not peremptory; it is possible to modify them gradually by a legal order.197 Reforms 
should not be hasty and be used as an excuse to exercise a greater oppression; it 
should be in accordance with the ideal of public rights under the existing 
circumstances, and to be used to bring about a lawful constitution, thus restoring the 
state of peace. 198 External assistance could be lent out to facilitate the establishment 
of the constitution, but never to force or manipulate the will of the people. 199 
Therefore unless there are extreme incidents that signify the non-existential of 
constitution and the de facto state of nature – that is the incidents of massacre or 
genocide – temporary unjust situation of a state shall not be used by other states as the 
ground for violation of its right of non-intervention.  
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5.3. North Korean Nuclear Security Complex and The Duty of Non-Intervention 
From the above we could know that the duty of non-intervention is an 
unconditional one in Kantian terms; except for in rare cases the duty is non-applicable 
to the regime; wherever it is applicable, it shall not be violated on any ground. In 
North Korean Nuclear Security Complex, is there any practice that violates this duty? 
In order to answer this question we need to first examine whether there is any state 
within this complex on which the duty is non-applicable.  
The Fifth Preliminary Article of PP dictates when a state is divided into two or 
more parts during an internal conflict; after this conflict is decided, external states can 
assist one of these parts with rehabilitation, reconstruction, and establishing a new 
constitution without being charged of violation of the duty of non-intervention.200 In 
this sense, the United States and China did not violate the duty by taking side and 
assisting rehabilitation of South Korea and North Korea respectively. In 1991, both 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(North Korea) were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations; since then they 
should be admitted as independent sovereign states and any attempt from other 
sovereign states to interact with either or both of these two states without their consent 
would be a direct violation of the duty of non-intervention.  
For the second type of exception, North Korea was regarded as a totalitarian regime 
by some, yet it has a legitimate constitution – imperfect as it might be to some but not 
so imperfect that it is non-existential. There is no confirmed massacre or genocide in 
North Korea; temporary unjust situation should be left to dissolve by itself or reform 
by the North Koreans’ own will. Therefore by the standard of Kantian nonideal theory, 
North Korea does not belong to either of the exceptions in which the right of non-
intervention does not apply, hence it shall boast its right of non-intervention like the 
rest of the states within the Complex.  
It was argued in last chapter, that North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapon 
under its historical background is morally permitted in the perspective of Kantian 
nonideal theory. As North Korea has taken on developing nuclear capability as a 
national policy, it has taken nuclear capability as a means of national defence; and 
exerting nuclear deterrence to avoid being coerced and being used as a means. 
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Therefore, all practices taken by other states or international organizations to interfere 
with such national policy should be scrutinized with a moral assessment to determine 
whether they are in violation of North Korean right of non-intervention. It is 
important to note that the violation of morality committed by North Korean does not 
excuse the violation of its right of non-intervention, as Kantian morality is not moral 
consequentialism.  
Nonetheless, there is a period of exception when North Korea acceded to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known as the NPT) in late 
1985, and before it legally withdrew from the NPT at the beginning of 2003. By 
signing the Treaty, North Korea is considered to concede to all the restrictions and 
requirements stipulated in the Treaty regarding nuclear nonproliferation. Any 
violation of the Treaty can be used as legal ground for punitive actions towards North 
Korea.  
Article III.4 of the Treaty stipulated that a non-nuclear-weapon state acceding to 
the Treaty must bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not later than 18 months after its 
accession. 201 North Korea did not enact its safeguards agreement until April 1992, 
hence the first and unvarnished violation. Following this, the IAEA had discovered 
various discrepancies between their inspection and what North Korea had presented in 
its Initial Report to the IAEA. Discrepancies include number and functionality of key 
buildings in nuclear complex, and amount and content of plutonium extracted from 
used fuel rods. 202 In order to clarify these mismatches, an IAEA special inspection 
was demanded on North Korea, which got rejected promptly. In May 1994, North 
Korea discharged used nuclear fuel in an unstructured way against IAEA’s suggestion, 
making any historical analysis of the core of the reactor impossible. 203 In June 1994, 
the IAEA decided to suspend all IAEA technical assistance to North Korea which 
responded three days later with a notice of withdrawal from the Agency. 204 October 
1994, US-DPRK Agreed Framework was signed which renewed stipulations 
regarding non-proliferation and conformity of IAEA safeguards agreement for North 
Korea. In November 1994, the United Nations Security Council instructed the IAEA 
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to enforce the tasks assigned to it in the Agreed Framework. Hence, the above was 
North Korea’s violation against the NPT and safeguards agreement signed according 
to the NPT during late 1985 to late 1994.  
In the IAEA report regarding North Korea’s violation of its NPT safeguards 
agreement, Fisher claimed that until the end of 1995, the IAEA was still not able to 
verify the completeness of the DPRK’s Initial Report and therefore the DPRK was in 
formal breach of its safeguards agreement.205 However as the Agreed Framework 
stipulated that the DPRK “will come into full compliance with its safeguards 
agreement”, when a significant portion of the LWR project undertaken by US led 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was completed but 
only “before delivery of key nuclear components”. 206 And the IAEA was asked to 
follow the Agreed Framework regarding North Korean nuclear inspection by the 
UNSC. As we knew from previous sections about Agreed Framework and KEDO, the 
construction of the LWR project had never gotten to the step of near completion. 
Whether the stipulation in the Agreed Framework regarding safeguards agreement 
compliance supersedes the original safeguards agreement is therefore controversial. 
Nonetheless, North Korea’s violation on the Article III of NPT and safeguards 
agreement from 1992 to mid-1994 was concrete. Therefore, any punitive actions done 
to North Korea regarding such violation – by either and/or both states within the 
Complex and international organizations like the UN – cannot be assessed as morally 
impermissible based on the ground of violation of the duty of non-intervention.  
As the implementation of the Agreed Framework was hindered largely by the US 
Congress among other factors, frustration mounted on North Korean side led to a 
ballistic missile test-launch in August 1998. Though missile test-launch is not banned 
in the NPT but is considered closely related to nuclear proliferation. After that it was 
around the time that North Korea secretly acquired uranium enrichment technologies 
and centrifuges from A.Q. Khan, which broke both the Agreed Framework and the 
NPT. Above are North Korea’s major breach against the NPT and its safeguards 
agreement, and the Agreed Framework. Any punitive actions based on these 
violations should not be determined morally impermissible for the reason of violation 
of North Korea’s right of non-intervention. However, even the violation of NPT does 
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not make the violation of North Korea’s right of non-intervention morally permitted. 
Punitive actions employed based on North Korea’s violation of NPT and its safeguard 
agreement should above all be moral, which means respect all rights of North Korea 
including the right of non-intervention. Further, employing punishment on North 
Korea’s violation of morality is morally proscribed to be used as a means or excuse to 
induce color revolution, to instigate peaceful evolution, or to practice any activities 
related to regime changing and removal of state key figures; as these actions are 
violations of right of non-intervention and/or are included in the actions listed by Kant 
in PP which would destroy mutual trust between states to beyond repair.  
 
 
6. The Obligation to Join a Union of States 
From previous chapters of interpretation of PP and MM, we know that Kant 
contends that it is states’ obligation to leave the state of nature and join a federal 
union of states. However it is equally important to note that states shall join this 
league voluntarily and autonomously; such union shall not be established with 
coercive law enforcement.  
The voluntariness of such union is the key in Kantian perspective, according to 
Pauline Kleingeld’s interpretation. Kleingeld argues that establishing a coercive state 
of states equals granting states a right to force other states into a union with coercive 
powers, strong states or group of states would end up setting the terms, subjecting 
other states to its laws and interests. Such despotism would quash any already existing 
rights that are secured internally by the subjected states, hence severely violating 
lawful freedom. 207 Such state of states may be governed by laws that are inconsistent 
with the autonomy of the member states, and might destroy the republican institutions 
which was established internally in the member states. 208 Kleingeld further depicted 
Kant’s vision of union of states by emphasizing that states that joined should not fuse 
together; as in Kant’s view, the initial separation of states reinforced by differences in 
language and religion, furthers the internal development within states – referred by 
Kant as “culture” – and cultural development within states will, Kant expects, lead to 
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greater unanimity on principles. 209 
 
6.1. North Korean Governing Strategy and the Obligation to Join A Union 
North Korea in Kim Il Sung time was firmly adherent to Kim’s unique political 
ideology – the Juche ideology, which was developed as a Korean version of Marxism-
Leninism that supposedly harmonized with the realities of the Korean situation. 210 
Juche commonly referred to as self-reliance; and Kim elevated this concept to a 
philosophical dogma to be strictly followed. 211 Juche, emanated from North Korea’s 
militant nationalism, comprises four main concepts – self-determination on ideology, 
independence on politics, self-reliance on economy, and self-defence on military 
affairs. Juche was a declaration of political independence from North Korea’s two 
then communist sponsors – the Soviet Union and China; it was also a symbol for 
North Korea’s autarky. 212  
During 1970s and 1980s, North Korean economy became increasingly stagnant, 
which was caused by the innate weaknesses of Juche ideology and the rigid 
employment of the Juche philosophy. North Korea was isolated from the international 
economy by Juche ideology for too long that caused an irreparable technological lag. 
Even when North Korea tried to induce limited foreign capital investment in the form 
of credit, its economy was not prepared to receive foreign capital and technology; 
therefore it later kept failing in discharging its debt obligations and became a chronic 
debtor state. 213 However, all these failure did not thwart the North Koreans from 
believing this ideology. In 1977, references to Marxism-Leninism were replaced by 
Juche in the North Korean constitution. And in 1992, after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, North Korean constitution was revised to substitute Juche for Marxism-
Leninism as a guiding principle of politics. 214  
Upon Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il took control of his office. 
Carefully groomed to be the sole successor of the regime by his father since early 
1980s, Kim Jong Il was a firm believer of the Juche ideology as well – he continued 
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to fully enforce Juche philosophy in all aspects of regime governing, and enhanced it 
by implementing the military-first policy – the Songun policy. However, the steeply 
declining economy caused by centrally planned economy, extravagant military 
spending, and droughts and floods pushed Kim Jong Il to make some reforms – 
abolishing state-managed rationing system, adjusting foreign exchange rate, freeing 
currency exchange. In 2002, North Korea even established the Sinuiju Special District 
as North Korea’s water-testing in international trading with special economic district. 
Yet such reform attempt did not last long; in 2005, the North Korean government 
announced the reviving of the Public Distribution System, under which all major food 
items were distributed by the state. It also terminated most international humanitarian 
assistance operations in the country, calling for development assistance only and 
under restrictions. Firm political control under the guidance of Juche ideology 
remains, inhibiting the loosening of economic regulations throughout the first decade 
of the 21st century. 215 
We could see North Korea chose autarky policies for state governing strategies in 
the time of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. With self-determination, independence, self-
reliance, and self-defence written in constitution as guiding principles, North Korea 
showed little desire to open up itself and join the international society, especially in 
political, economic, and military aspects. It was trying to exclude itself as much as 
possible from full-scale globalization; trying to close the country up and rely on itself 
as much as possible. It would be hard to imagine the current North Korea actively and 
voluntarily joining any union of states, except for normalizing relations with the 
United States. Although it is North Korea’s obligation and immediate duty to join a 
union of state, like the NPT, for the further realization of peace and perpetual peace; 
its decision of joining cannot be a forced one.  
 
6.2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
As a union of states that aims at control and eventually solve the global nuclear 
proliferation problem, the NPT – at least when it was initialed – is to be considered 
one of the leagues of states that Kant refers to as congress, which is the middle 
ground stage the world needs to go through before full realization of perpetual peace. 
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All states are obligated to join such congress.  
Article X Section One of the Treaty stipulated that each sovereign party that 
acceded the Treaty have the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events 
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. In a detailed report from the 
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) explaining North Korea’s withdrawal decision, 
North Korea indicated the extraordinary events to be the full breach on the U.S. side 
of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the annually conducted US-POK military 
exercises along with continuous build-up of the armed forces of nuclear attacks in 
Northeast Asia, and the triggering events of Bush’s unipolar foreign policy. 216 With 
the branding of “Axis of Evil” and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, North Korea’s 
perception of threat of war is not unfounded.   
Since establishment, the NPT has suffered from non-compliance – some of them 
constructed the possibility of material breach and/or institutional subversion of the 
regime which might lead to the questioning or even obsolete of the viability of the 
regime. Member non-compliance includes Article II violations by North Korea, Iran 
and others that have sought nuclear weapons capabilities. 217 According to Doyle, it 
also includes the political refusal to enter into good faith negotiations toward 
complete nuclear disarmament by the five de jure nuclear states, which at least 
constructs a failure to concerting efforts toward realization of Article VI of the Treaty. 
218 The possibilities to address the misbehavior of the five nuclear powers are either 
highly improbable – for example self-imposed sanctions – or highly controversial – 
like threats from non-nuclear states to dissolve the regime through collective 
withdrawal, and violations of the Treaty in the name of state survival or security. 219 
Doyle contended that failure to address such non-compliance may lead to plausible 
infer that the NPT has been diverted away from an arms control and disarmament 
regime that represented the general will of the founding parties toward an arms 
control regime that serves the exclusive national interests of the five NWSs. Continue 
compliance with the Treaty would no longer serve the purpose of nonproliferation as 
a means to an eventual nuclear disarmament,; instead it would reinforces a different 
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institutional purpose, namely ‘nuclear apartheid’. 220  Furthermore, the exports of 
nuclear technology and materials from the nuclear weapons states to some non-
nuclear weapon states has caused a fundamental change in the nuclear trade market by 
stimulating the beginnings of a second-tier proliferation network. Therefore, although 
North Korea has substantial violation of the Treaty articles, it does not nullify the 
legitimacy of its decision to withdraw from the NPT. 221  The implication of the 
potential breach and/or institutional subversion of the NPT regime makes it a 
questionable regime to rejoin for the North Koreans to pledge their desire for global 
nuclear disarmament.  
 
6.3. The US-DPRK Relations Normalization 
The normalization of the US-DPRK relation maybe the only league of nations the 
North Korea is willing to join at this moment. Compared to the current state of nature 
between the United States and North Korea, the normalization of relation would mean 
a commitment from both sides on ceasing hostility and promoting peaceful 
coexistence, hence a congress in Kantian term. It is obligated for both the U.S. and 
DPRK to join such congress so that it eventually evolves into a universal federal 
union.  
Whether they have enough mutual trust to join such congress is one of the 
determining factors for the establishment of this congress. This congress is also the 
key to solve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, as normalization of relations between 
the United States and North Korea alleviates tension between both sides and nullifies 
the reason for heavy weaponry deployment in the region. As the grounding for 
military deployment and nuclear capability development ceases to exist, any nuclear 
proliferation activity would be considered aggressive instead of self-defence.  
Historical evidence suggests currently the United States and North Korea may not 
have enough mutual trust to enter such union. After the collapse of Agreed 
Framework and the speech of “Axis of Evil”, relations between the two states took a 
nose dive and nuclear proliferation situation has aggravated. Six-party Talks casted 
positive effects on both but only in a slow pace. Six-party Talks involves more parties 
 
220 Ibid.  
221 Ibid., p. 143.  
56 
 
than bilateral negotiations, there are intrinsic traits exist in multilateral negotiations 
that may cause problems. For example, wide divergence might exist among members 
of the Talks regarding their perceptions about what stage they believe the negotiations 
have entered.222 Leaving such gap(s) unsolved and growing would lead to deadlock or 
even break-down of the negotiation. Different standpoints and divergent priorities of 
parties lead to unnecessary linkage of issues hence hampers the negotiation progress. 
Division in perceptions of key players regarding crucial issues might hinder further on 
the negotiation – for Six-party Talks, the perception division between Washington and 
Beijing regarding the leverage China has over North Korea is important. 223  The 
divergence in multiple aspects in the Six-party Talks maybe the main reason for its 
lag in achieving substantial results.  
But the most significate issue with the Six-party Talks, same as with any other 
negotiation attempt to dissolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, is the dismissal of 
direct pegging of the nuclear crisis with US-DPRK relations normalization.  Until the 
normalization of relations between these two states, North Korean nuclear issue will 
remain unsolved, and nuclear disarmament of Korean Peninsula unachieved.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to establish what Kantian non-ideal theory 
is, how it can be used as philosophical guidance in international political field, and its 
application on the North Korean Nuclear Security Complex. There is little doubt that 
our world is in nonideal circumstances under philosophical standards. As Adam Swift 
suggested, a sophisticated philosophical system should not only be applicable in ideal 
circumstances, but also shed light on navigation of human activities in nonideal 
circumstances. Furthermore, in nonideal circumstances, not only should such system 
be sufficient to be used for analyzing different values at hand; it should provide 
guidelines on prioritizing those values for practical application.  
Kantian philosophy is such a theoretical system – within one moral system exists 
two layers of theories that governing two worlds respectively – one ideal world with 
only perfectly just situations, in which everyone acts justly and rationally, and all 
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conditions of all aspects allow the realization of full justice; one nonideal world with 
unjust situations, non-compliance, punishment, war, and conditions and circumstances 
that make accomplishing comprehensive justice impossible. Kantian nonideal theory 
is the layer of theories which manages the nonideal world – it is a weaker version of 
Kantian ideal normativity yet shares the same origin; it applies in nonideal 
circumstances to bring the world closer to the supreme objectives of humanity.   
T.E Doyle’s application of Kantian nonideal theory on Iranian Proliferation 
Complex inspired my analysis with North Korean Nuclear Security Complex 
employing the same theory. The right of self-defence is one of the primary arguments 
in both Doyle’s work and this dissertation. However the individual right of self-
defence does not necessarily equal the right of national defence – the association and 
relations between the two are to be deduced. It is problematic to make the domestic 
analogies of individual right of self-defence a default prerequisite.  
Reading Kant’s work we could know that individuals as citizens of a state have the 
right to wield their rights of self-defence collectively to prevent themselves from 
external attacks; they are permitted to form armies, acquire weapons, and employ 
other necessary preparations for such collective self-defence. Therefore, it is morally 
permitted for states to defend themselves against attacks, and it is considered the 
collective wielding of individual self-defence by all citizens of the state. And lying as 
national defence means is morally permitted as well in the stance of Kantian nonideal 
theory when dealing with a deceiver. As nuclear weapon states and de facto nuclear 
weapon states are deceiving in the form of nuclear deterrence by owning nuclear 
weapons, it is morally permitted for North Korea to deceive in form of nuclear 
deterrence so that it would not be used as a means by other deceivers. As individual 
right of self-defence is best seen as a reciprocal relation. So is the national defence 
right between sovereign states. The extent of national defence should be limited in an 
area between minimum effectiveness to the extent of the perpetrator’s offense.  
One of the prerequisites for states to have the right to go to war and prepare for war 
is that said state should be in the state of nature. Doyle suggested current international 
relations is in a state of nature, which is an idea that requires more debates and 
analysis. The alternative of state of nature and the necessary state for perpetual peace 
in Kant’s work is some kind of league of nations which I proposed to be identified as 
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a federal union of states, which is a multi-state political form that has power division 
between two levels of government with equal status. According to Kant’s work and 
multiple interpretation of scholars, I argued that our current world is not in the full 
realization of perpetual peace and one universal federal union of states; but it is not in 
a complete state of nature as well – it is in a partial state of nature, which is 
considered an in-between stage of a gradual development from international state of 
nature to universal federal union of states. Partial state of nature means that some 
states have already joined the associations of states which will eventually develop into 
the universal union, but some other have not yet joined. Therefore, the rights of states 
depend on the related status a state is in with the others – for the states that joined the 
union, they are obligated to keep the peace among the members of the union, and they 
have the right to go to war and prepare for war with a non-member state; for the non-
member states, they have the right to go to war with both members and non-members, 
and they are obligated to willingly join the union.  
National defence can only be invoked when the following conditions are met: the 
defender must have substantial evidence of the threat of aggression made on it and/or 
substantial evidence indicating the increase of the offender’s power is menacing; no 
act of hostility is permitted if it would destruct mutual trust for states in entering 
perpetual peace in the future.  
For moral assessment of acquiring and stockpiling nuclear weapons, it is morally 
obligated for the acquirer to take necessary precautions and acquire necessary 
technologies to prevent accidental or unauthorized triggering of the weapons. In the 
process of acquisition, handling, storing and transporting, and deploying nuclear 
weapons, it would render the process morally impermissible if any kind of direct harm 
was done to or will inevitably be done to a human life of whom did not give rational 
consent to sacrifice his/her life for said process, or there is no reason to believe that 
s/he will give such consent.  
Based on domestic analogies of individual right of self-defence, and the reciprocal 
nature of such right, nuclear deterrence exertion should follow these rules for moral 
legitimacy: it is morally permissive to exert nuclear strategic deterrence generally – 
meaning not posing threat to any specific target – when one is under specific-targeted 
nuclear deterrence. When such deterrence fails and deterrer is under nuclear attacks, it 
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is permissive to carry out deterrence only to military targets of the offender. It is 
permissible to exert specific nuclear deterrence to military targets, meaning aiming at 
them with nuclear weapon, and carry out deterrence when it fails. It is morally 
prohibited to attack civilian target with nuclear weapon at any point. It is morally 
permitted to threaten nuclear deterrence to civilian targets only when the deterrer 
genuinely believes it is the only way to stop a war of extermination. On nuclear 
aspirant’s activities to increase credibility of nuclear deterrence, they are permitted if 
the aspirant only intends them as a means of deterrence.  
Assessing North Korean related practice according to the above moral principles, 
we could know that North Korea’s nuclear capability is so far within the morally 
permissive scale. All the nuclear test explosions were morally permitted except for the 
2016 claimed nuclear missile warhead test-launch. 
Besides the right of self-defence, the duty of non-intervention is another Kantian 
nonideal argument that can be based on for the moral assessment of the practice of 
states in the North Korean Nuclear Security Complex. There are three distinctive 
features of intervention: domestic affairs and external affairs as two destinations for 
intervention; the compelling of the sovereign will of the interfered state; intervention 
is to be distinguished from war. There are two types of exception when interfering 
another country’s affairs would not be considered violation of the duty; in the 
situation of the Complex, none of the states within belongs to either type. In 
contemporary international relations, interference does not necessarily involve 
military force or threat – economic interference such as sanctions or restricted 
interaction with the targeted state are also commonly used for intervention. As North 
Korea belongs to neither cases of exception where the right of non-intervention does 
not apply, all practices taken by other states or international organizations aiming to 
punish North Korea’s attempts to acquiring nuclear military capability are to be 
assessed for potential violation of the duty of non-intervention.  
In 1985, North Korea acceded to the NPT, withdrew in 2003. Within this period, 
any punitive action done to North Korea regarding its violation of the NPT cannot be 
assessed as morally impermissible based on the ground of violation of the duty of 
non-intervention. North Korea’s 2016 claimed nuclear missile warhead test-launch 
was also considered immoral, hence any punitive action done because of it also 
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cannot be assessed as morally impermissible using non-intervention as ground.  
Kant states in his work that it is an obligation and immediate duty for states to join 
the universal federal union of states, yet it is crucial that the decision of joining should 
be a voluntary and autonomous one. Undoubtably North Korea has the obligation to 
join a union of states, however judging from its continuous governing strategy and 
state ideology, it is unlikely for North Korea to willingly and actively commit to 
joining any union of states except for the relation normalization with the United States. 
The NPT has suffered potential institutional subversion which would seriously 
undermine the viability of the Treaty regarding facilitating nonproliferation cause and 
representing the unanimous will of global nuclear disarmament of all the signatories. 
Therefore it is questionable that North Korea should rejoin such treaty should it have 
the desire to express commitment to nuclear disarmament.  
The US-DPRK relation normalization maybe the key to eventual nuclear 
disarmament in the Korean Peninsula. It is obligated for both the U.S. and North 
Korea to join such union, yet the mutual trust between them currently may not be 
sufficient to support such decision. The Six-party Talks had helped significantly in 
non-proliferation issue in the Peninsula, yet failing to directly peg the nuclear issue 
with US-DPRK relations normalization is hindering and will continue to hinder the 
disarmament progress in the region.  
Kantian nonideal theory is not political realism. On the contrary, it holds highest 
perpetual peace, same as Kantian ideal theory. Yet peace loving does not equal 
unilateral disarmament; for that might lead to catastrophic consequences in both 
reality and morality – becoming or being forced into being capitulationist would be 
one of the consequences in reality; losing one’s freewill and becoming a means 
instead of an end would be one of the moral ones. Even though there is currently no 
international war, the gloomy cloud of Iraq War and the lingering smell of gunpower 
from the clash between the U.S. and Iran over the death of Iranian military leader 
remind us just how close international wars and proxy wars are away from us. Amid 
the current situation with the U.S. and its allies, acquiring nuclear military capability 
might be the best chance for North Korea to stay away from external political 
interference and the danger of getting involved into wars. Global nuclear disarmament 
does not come from unilateral disarmament of several states, or the physical denial 
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and technological secrecy of nuclear military capability; it should come from a 
systematic change of mainstream nuclear mindset, together with the change of current 
non-proliferation institution – devaluing, de-alerting, and delegitimizing; and 
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